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CHAPTERV
Liberalization
In July 1967 the National Liberation Council (NLC) government chose to
devalue and launch the economy on an experiment with import liberalization.
Four and one-half years later the liberalization had collapsed. The licencing
system for 1972 was as restrictive as the system of a decade earlier. What led
to this experiment? What were its essential features? And finally, what went
wrong? It is to these and related questions that we now turn.
1. The devaluation decision
To see what led to the devaluation and liberalization, we resume our
historical narrative, left off in Chapter II, with the situation at the end of
1966. At this point the economy was approximately back in the situation of
1962 through 1964. Numerous instruments had been brought to bear on the
balance-of-payments problem. Yet the decline in reserves continued, and the
prospect was dim that further measures to defend the official exchange rate
would succeed in reversing the trend. At this point there began active con-
sideration of what had long been regarded as the last resort: devaluation.
Conventional wisdom, based largely on a structuralist elasticitypessimism,
continued to oppose devaluation as a means of achieving external balance.
Yet the corruption of the late Nkrumah era, together with the severe aus-
terity imposed on the post-coup economy for balance-of-payments reasons,
combined to produce substantial dissatisfaction with the existing system as a
long-term solution. A major body of domestic opinion, mostly the new com-
mercial and industrial upper-middle class, viewed controls and austerity as
undesirable, and an import liberalization as a means of discarding both.
There was a general recognition that no significant liberalization could be
achieved without a devaluation. However, there was little recognition that
control over aggregate demand would be more urgent in a liberalized system.
1. This view, for example, was reflected subsequently in the Progress Party Manifesto.
Accra, 1969, p. 5, where trade controls were said to "have harmed the welfare of
the consumer and prevented an orderly growth of the economy."110 Liberalization
This failure would contribute eventually to the downfall of the liberalization
experiment.
In official circles much the same line of reasoning prevailed and was rein-
forced by consideration of two external factors.2 Private foreign investment
was said to be discouraged by the increasingly evident exchange risk, and
creditor and donor countries were unlikely to be generous unless Ghana put
its balance of payments in order.
The need for external support was pressing. The gap between mmimum
foreign exchange requirements and expected earnings for 1967 amounted to
95 million according to a Bank of Ghana estimate.3 On turning to the
medium-term official creditors in late 1966, the NLC government obtained
substantial rescheduling of the debts falling due through 1968, thus providing
immediate breathing space, but no long-term relief.4 And in early 1967 the
IMF convened a meeting of Ghana's ten major western donor countries, with
the result of increased aid offers. Yet neither of these forms of relief could be
regarded as anything more than a short-term palliative. If external assistance
were to continue for long, Ghana would have to put its balance of payments
in order. Devaluation would provide such an opportunity.5
on July b,1967the then Commissioner of Finance and NLC Member,
Brigadier A.A. Afrifa, announced the devaluation. In doing so he skillfully
attributed the continuing balance-of-payments difficulties to the inflationary
policies pursued by Nkrumah, and put forward as the only alternative to
devaluation a further expenditure reduction or a more restrictive licencing
system, neither of which, he noted, were favorably regarded. At the same
time he justified the "stabilization" (austerity) program of the previous 16
months on the grounds thatit permitted devaluation from a position of
strength. In summing up, he put forward devaluation as a necessary and
logical decision taken in Ghana's own interest. No foreign pressure was either
officially acknowledged or blamed, although in a post-devaluation press re-
lease E.N. Omaboe, Commissioner of Economic Affairs, is quoted as saying
that "donor countries are no doubt going to be impressed by the boldness
with which we have approached these chronic economic problems."6
2.See J.H. Frirnpong-Ansah, "Stabilization and Development: Ghana's Experience,"
Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Second Series, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1970. Mr. Frimpong-
Ansah was Governor of the Bank of Ghana from 1967 through 1972.
3. Bank of Ghana, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, January—June 1967, p. 3.
4. Payments due in 1966, 1967, and 1968 amounting to 180 millionwere reduced
to46 million in those years by shifting the debt into the future. This is discussed
in more detail in section 3 below.
5. We are not aware, however, of any prior undertaking by Ghana to devalue or by
donors to support the devaluation. And no such undertaking was officially acknowl-
edged later by either side.
6. Quoted in Legon Observer, Vol. 2, No. 16 (4 August, 1967), p. 16.The DevaluationDecision 111
Thedevaluation package itself emphasized the exchange.rate adjustment,
and did not involve an immediate large-scale liberalization of imports. The
official price of foreign exchange was increased by about 43 percent, from
0.7 14 per dollar to 1.020 per dollar. In recognition that the pur-
chasing monopsony for cocoa by the CMB fixed the producer price in terms
of local rather than foreign currency, the producer price of cocoa was in-
creased by 30 percent.7 However, producer prices of minor agricultural ex-
ports controlled by the CMB were left unchanged for several months. As a
small sweetener, the minimum wage was immediately increased by 7.7 per-
cent (from N4 0.65 per day to 0.70 per day) and government wages and
salaries were increased by 5 percent. Import levies on some essential com-
modities which typically did not contain a substantial quota premium were
reduced. The liberalization component was mostly in the form of a long-term
commitment to expand the OGL list and to permit more liberal remittances
of profits. The immediate expansion of the OGL list covered only a few
items, with a more substantial widening taking place when the regulations
covering the 1968 calendar year were announced in the next month. The
direction of the NLC liberalization policy was clear. What remained to be
seen was how far the NLC would go towards complete liberalization of im-
ports.
Public reaction to the devaluation is difficult to gauge, for without a
parliament and a vigorous press, concerted adverse criticism was not a serious
problem for the government. Perhaps the most representative adverse criti-
cism of the devaluation appeared in the semi-intellectual Legon Observer, by
a commentator under the pen name Kontopiaat. From a complaint about
high living costs. he went on to rely mostly on an elasticity pessimism type
argument. For exports he noted facetiously that his cocoa trees had suddenly
stepped up their yield since the devaluation, and that he was seriously con-
templating exporting mosquitoes to South Africa, snakes and scorpions to
Rhodesia, snails and frogs to France. He argued further that since the world
price of these primary commodities was fixed, one could not, for some un-
specified reason, boost export revenues by devaluation. For imports he que-
ried where could local substitutes be found? "We can surely use plantain fibre
for wigs;...charcoal and palm oil for soap; and canes for hulahoops...; the list
of local substitutes, you see, is quite impressive...'.'8 Another major theme
was that higher costs of imported machinery and materials adversely affected
7. Note that a devaluation provides an opportunity to increase the producer price
without reducing government revenue vis-à-vis the pre-devaluation situation because
the foreign price denominated in local currency also rises.
8. Legon Observer, Vol. 2, No. 19 (15 September 1967), p. 26.112 Liberalization
business, particularly small Ghanaian businessmen relative to expatriate busi-
nessmen, the latter being somehow unaffected. -
Asufficiently large grain of truth existed in each of Kontopiaat's major
arguments to make them generally accepted among many of the opponents of
devaluation. Most educated critics did not distinguish between low, but never-
theless significant, elasticities and the assumed zero elasticities. The complaint
about higher living costs was typically based on a before—after rather than a
with--without comparison: a valid judgment in the former case, but not in
the latter. The burden on local manufacturers was somewhat more complex.
Whether or not high input costs were offset by higher output prices in a
before—after comparison depended largely on the degree of protection con-
tained in the pre-devaluation quota premia.9 En a with—without comparison
local manufacturers could have expected higher input prices from suppliers
even in the absence of devaluation.
The polemics of political debate aside, what were the economic effects of
the devaluation? In particular, did it act to correct the external imbalance and
permit import liberalization to proceed as promised? It is to this set of issues
that we now turn.
2. Short-run effects of the devaluation package
Six years had passed since the open deficit in Ghana's balance of payments
had been closed by the system of exchange controls and import licencing.
The excess demand for real resources which generated the deficit had been
vented on the domestic price level. As a result, the domestic prices of trade-
ables were out of line with international prices.
The objective of a devaluation in these circumstances isto bring the tr
domestic prices of tradeables into line with the international price level and
subsequently ensure that, at the new set of prices, a new excess demand for
real resources does not emerge. Hence the primary focus of our analysis of
the short-run effects of the devaluation is on domestic prices and aggregate
expenditure. In addition, a devaluation almost inevitably alters the distribu-
tiori of income, an issue that merits consideration. thi
m
(a)The impact of devaluation on domestic relative prices
The circumstances in which the 1967 devaluation was introduced are of
fundamental importance in evaluating its impact. The restrictive trade and
payments regime had been functioning for several years, bottling up the 10.
9.This is discussed in more detail below.Fig. V-i. Foreign-exchange market.
excess demand and transferring its location from outside to inside the coun-
try. Of particular importance for our present discussion is the fact that the
value of imports in terms of foreign exchange had already been restricted to
less than the level that would obtain at an equilibrium exchange rate. 10
This situation is illustrated by means of the usual heuristic presentation of
the foreign-exchange market in Figure V.1. The vertical and horizontal axes
measure the price and quantity of foreign exchange. For our purposes assume
the dollar is the unit of foreign exchange and the new cedi the local currency.
The demand and supply curves of dollars are represented by and
Assume that these arise only from imports and exports.
ie 10. Further, the deflationary policy that had been followed for approximately twelve
months meant that the latent excess demand was smaller than it would have been at
a more acceptable (higher) level of domestic expenditure. This is considered further
in section 2b below.
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Underlying the generation and use of foreign exchange are the domestic
markets in which exporters are paid and importers pay in local currency for
the goods that enter the international markets. If there are trade taxes the
rates at which domestic offers and demands of new cedis for dollars arise will
differ from the rates at which the national offers and demands are made. On
the export side, a tax means that exporters will receive fewer new cedis per
dollar than the nation does. Thus we have drawn the domestic supply curve
of dollars as DSfX, which lies below the curve Sfx due to the export tax. If
the export tax is some arbitrary sum (as in the case of Ghanaian cocoa) the
precise relationship between the two curves is not clearly defined. On the
import side. the domestic curve lies above due to the import tariff.
The situation depicted in Figure V.1 is a closed deficit at the fixed ex-
change rate r0. The excess demand of Q0Q1 is not satisfied because of either
an unwillingness to draw down reserves by the amount necessary or simply
the absence of adequate reserves. Assuming that exactly the quantity of
dollars generated is made available for import (0Q0), the ultimate purchasers
of this value of imports pay Or0 new cedis per dollar to purchase the foreign
exchange, in import tariffs, and to the recipients of the li-
cence premium.
In these circumstances the fact that the dollar value of imports has already
been restricted to less than the level that would obtain at the equilibrium
exchange rate is readily apparent. Because of this previous restriction, a de-
valuation can aim at expanding both the quantity of foreign exchange earned
and eventually the quantity of foreign exchange used. It need not aim at "the
restoration of equilibrium in Ghana's balance of payment through stimulating
exports and curtailing imports."Rather, the appropriate objective is to
permit art expansion of both the quantities of foreign exchange generated and
used via an upward adjustment of the exchange rate to the point where the
latent excess demand is eliminated due to expanding export earnings, and
demand for imports is contained by price rather than licences. 1 2
The achievement of the objective is by no means automatic. The presence
of discretionary "distortions" on the import side, and in the case of Ghana on
the export side, means that the devaluation will not be transmitted auto-
matically to the markets for tradeables in the domestic economy. Conse-
quently it is entirely possible to have a devaluation in which one or both of
11. CBS,Economic Survey. 1967, Accra, p.31.
12. In the case of a downward sloping supply curve of foreign exchange (but assuming a
stable market) a devaluation moves in the direction of equilibrium by contraction of
both the quantities generated and used, but in a closed deficit, the contraction of
the quantity used is clearly smaller than in the case of an open deficit.
___-.j.S
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theexport and import sidesisunaffected. The necessary discretionary
changes may simply not be made.
On the export side, if the distortion is not an ad-valorem export tax, only
by chance will the change in the new cedi price facing export producers
reflect appropriately the rate of devaluation. For example, if the export tax is
a residual between a fixed producer price and the world price, the local
currency producer price must be increased for there to be any transmission of
the devaluation. Movement along the curve arises because of movement
along the domestic producers' supply curve, not the other way around. In
terms of Figure V-i, if the price facing export producers does not reflect the
devaluation, the quantity of foreign exchange supplied will not rise by the
amount predicted from considering Sfr and the change in the official ex-
change rate.
On the import side it is important to distinguish between the immediate
impact of the devaluation and the subsequent changes that may come about
as the quantity of foreign. exchange supplied increases. The immediate effect
of the devaluation, assuming the dollar magnitude of the licences is kept
constant, is to narrow the licence premium gap between r0 and in Figure
V.!.13 If the devaluation does not entirely close this gap immediately (and it
need not, for the expected expansion of the quantity supplied has yet to take
place), the price facing ultimate domestic purchasers of imports is unaffected.
Nothing happens to the level of foreign-exchange utilization unless the li-
cencirig authorities change the dollar value of licences issued. Later, as the
quantity of foreign exchange available expands, the licencing authorities can
increase the foreign exchange available for imports resulting in a movement
down the curve DDfX and an eventual elimination of the gap between the
new exchange rate and the rate along .Insum, a devaluation on impact
need not mean an increased price facing ultimate domestic purchasers of
imports, and can eventually mean a decrease in that price.
In terms of this analytical framework, the changes in prices facing export
producers are a useful measure of the extent to which the devaluation is
transmitted to exporters. The prices facing purchasers of imports may initial-
ly not change at all. If they rise, the devaluation has on impact more than
13. Where imports are for resale, the premium gap is captured as the import items move
along the resale chain from the licence recipient to the ultimate purchasers for final
use. Where imports are for own use and (as in Ghana) there is no auction system for
licences or resale is uncommon, the premium gap is implicit, arising from the quota
restriction and the derived demand for the items imported for own use. The follow-
ing discussion is phrased in terms of imports for resale. Hence for the case of
imports for own use one should read "the implicit premium-inclusive price" in place
of "the price facing ultimate domestic purchasers."116 Liberalization
eliminated the licence premium, and if they eventually fall because the expan-
sion of foreign-exchange earnings permits an increase in licences, the devalua-
tion may be termed a success.
The issue arising from the 1967 devaluation is: to what extent was the
external change in the new cedi price of a dollar transmitted to the domestic
markets for tradeables? The relationships involved are readily expressed in
algebraic form, which we have done in an appendix to this chapter. 14 Our
measure relates the domestic price change to the foreign price change asso-
ciated with the devaluation. The calculations generally involve comparisons
between the weighted monthly average of the pre-devaluation period of
January through June 1967 and the post-devaluation period of August
through December 1967. (Devaluation occurred on July 8, 1967.) These
periods were selected to be short enough to avoid extensive extraneous in-
fluences not associated with the devaluation, and at the same time long
enough to iron out monthly fluctuations. The net result is an estimate of the
percentage change in new cedis per dollar received by the export producers or
paid by the ultimate import purchasers.
(1) Exports. Our calculations for the export side are contained in Table
V-i-Theseshould be taken as nothing more than a rough indicator of what in
fact occurred. Several simplifications had to be made in order to arrive at
these approximations. For export prices we used unit values from the export
trade statistics. Producer prices of the CMB commodities were those paid at
the buying stations scattered throughout the country. Producer prices of
timber were derived by deducting the export taxes paid at the rates for 1966
for the pre-devaluation prices and the rates for 1968 for post-devaluation
prices. Additional points are noted in Table V-i.
Turning to the results, there is some variation between commodities. In
the case of cocoa, the CMB increased the producer price by 30 percent
immediately after the devaluation. The export unit values rose by over 32
percent in the post-devaluation period, so that the market appears to have
adjusted to a nearly complete transmission of the devaluation to domestic
producers.'5 For timber, specific export tax levies were reduced immediately
14. See Appendix E.
15. Note that the change in export unit value is very nearly equal to the export price
increase that would have been predicted had the producer price change exactly
equalled the change required for full transmission (33 percent). See Appendix E for
details of this calculation.
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Table V-i
Transmission of 1967 devaluation to domestic prices of exports
Commodity Percentage Post-devaluatio n index Percentage change,
of (pre-deval. =100) in new cedis per
exports ProducerExport dollar
1966a price priceb
Cocoa beansC 55.5 130.0 132.7 40.0
Cocoa butter 6.2 144.8 144.8 42.9
Timber (logs and
sawn)d 11.3 128.0 126.4 44.6
Bauxite 0.8 138.9 138.9 42.9
Manganese 6.5 120.6 120.6 42.9
Diamonds 5.8 147.3 134.1 57.0
Gold 9.2 126.1 126.1 42.9
Kola nutsC 0.7 100.0 148.0 —3.5
Palm kernelsC 0.0001 114.5 135.1 21.0
CoffeeC 1.2 111.0 68.2 132.6
Bananasc 0.0013 113.9 159.1 2.3
Shea nutsC 0.0027 104.2 88.1 68.8
Sub total and average97.1 43.04
Otherse 2.9 42.86
Total and average 100.0 43.03
Notes:a.Export percentages derived from Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly
Digest of Statistics, June 1968 —exceptfor kola nuts, palm kernels, cof-
fee, bananas and shea nuts, which were calculated from CBS, External
Trade Statistics (monthly), December 1966.
b.Export unit values used to calculate export prices pre-devaluation (Jan.—
June 1967) and post-devaluation (Au&—Dec. 1967) were calculated from
CBS, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, June 1968 and March 1969, except for
kola nuts, palm kernels, coffee, bananas and shea nuts, which were cal-
culated from CBS, External Trade Statistics (monthly), various issues,
1967.
c.These items are handled by the CMB, and the domestic prices are the
producer prices paid by the CMB pre- and post-devalution. The cocoa bean
price was changed shortly after devaluation: the producer price change for
the others isthe change from 1967 to 1968. See CMB, Ghana Cocoa
Marketing Board at Work, Accra, 1968, Taking the producer price change
as zero for these items yields the following change in new cedis per dollar
in 1967 alone: palm kernels =5.7237percent; coffee =109.5785 percent;
bananas—10.2015 percent; shea nuts =62.0927percent.
d. The domestic prices pre- and post-devaluation for timber were derived by
deducting the export tax at the ad valorem equivalent for 1966 from the
pre-devaluation export price and for 1968 from the post-devaluation ex-
port price. The export duties and export values are from CBS, Quarterl,v




after the devaluation. The change in domestic prices thus more than reflected
the devaluation.16
The remaining items are minerals, and agricultural commodities handled
by the CMB. The mineral exports, except for diamonds won by African
diggers, were not subject to export tax either before or after the devaluation
and hence there was no mechanism to prevent full transmission o the deval-
uation. A 9 percent export tax on diamonds won by African diggers was
eliminated immediately after the devaluation, resulting in a larger price rise to
domestic producers. 1 7
The CMB is responsible for the purchase and sale of several minor corn-
modities: coffee, palm kernels, copra, shea nuts, kola nuts, ground nuts, and
bananas. Of these only coffee, shea nuts, kola nuts, and bananas were exported
in 1966 and 1967. The CMB's response to the devaluation for these corn-
modities was delayed until producer prices were set for the following crop
year. And the response in general was considerably less than the devaluation.
Taking into account trends in world prices however, and hence new cedi
export prices, the net result was virtually no change in the producer prices
relative to the international prices for bananas and kola nuts, and very large
relative changes for shea nuts and coffee.
Putting all the export items together, the weighted average transmission of
the devaluation was fractionally more than the 42.86 percent gross devalua-
tion: for those commodities considered, the domestic price rise was 43.04
percent, and for all exports (assuming full transmission for the remainder) it
was 43.03 percent.
16. Despite the relatively large change in prices facing domestic producers of timber, it
is important to note that not only must the signal of the devaluation be transmitted
to the domestic economy (which in this case it was), but it must be allowed to S
work. There is some evidence, however, that congestion at the port of Takoradi
resulted in a smaller response of timber exports than might have been achieved.
"Present facilities [at Takoradi], mechanical handling equipment, and methods are
totally inadequate to handle expeditiously the present volume of traffic [of logs and
sawn timber] ,"NathanConsortium for Sector Studies, Ports Study. Transport,
1970,AnnexV,p.3.
17.lhis probably overstates the case substantially for diamonds as a whole. The dia-
monds that appear in the export statistics are almost entirely the product of large-
scale operations, but in addition individual diamond diggers win what is reported to
be a considerable amount of diamonds. However, the purchasing authorities re-
portedly pay low prices and purchase only from licenced diggers (and licences are
difficult to obtain). Hence there is a substantial amount of outward smuggling that
is not directly affected by the official exchange rate.
I
-
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(2)Imports.18We turn now to the import side, focusing on items which
are imported and resold. The issue here is: what was the direction and extent
of the change in prices of imports facing the ultimate domestic purchasers of
imports? The domestic market for imports in 1967 was almost totally under
the influence of import licencing. And for most goods the binding constraint
was the level of licences issued, not the duty-paid price. In these circum-
stances the result of a devaluation depends on both the local currency c.i.f.
price change due to the exchange rate change and on the magnitude of the
licences before and after the devaluation. Our focus is on the impact effect of
the devaluation and hence the appropriate case is one in which the dollar
value of licences is kept constant. Itis only later when foreign-exchange
receipts have risen that one can expect import licences to be increased.
To measure the percentage change in new cedis paid per dollar of imports
we focused on the change in the domestic price. This assumes an infinitely
elastic foreign supply of imports. We were unable to develop a complete
measure of the changes in domestic prices of imports for resale, but as an
approximate measure we resorted to changes in prices of importable items in
the domestic wholesale price index. Our data consisted of the monthly re-
ported wholesale prices of each importable item in the CBS Wholesale Price
Index.
In virtually all cases the prices preceding devaluation were constant from
three or more months. Following devaluation, some prices continued at their
former level, and most of the remainder increased to some new higher level.
In a very few cases there was a decline. Our measure of the change in price
attributable to the devaluation was the difference between the pre-devalua-
tion price and the new price, implicitly assuming that world prices of imports
did not change. The new price was almost universally set and kept within the
remaining months of the year, although the approach to the new price varied;
in some cases the price rose bit by bit to the new level, and in others there
was a sharp rise followed by a decline to the new price.
To arrive at a very rough estimate of the overall effect of the devaluation
on domestic prices of importables for resale, we computed two import-
weighted averages of the price changes, confining our attention to consumer
goods.19 For both averages we matched each importable item fromthe
Wholesale Price Index with the SITC 3-digit group it most appropriately
represented. In cases where more than one item fell in a 3-digit group we split
18. The cooperation of the Central Bureau of Statistics in arranging for detailed extrac-
tions from the Wholesale Price Index returnsisgratefully acknowledged. i.E.
Tandoh, the Government Statistician, and SW.K. Sosuh, Chief of the Primary Statis-
tics Division, were particularly helpful.
19. Consumer goods imports amounted to 31 percent of total imports in 1966. and 33
percent in 1967. See Table A-4a.
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the group among the items. Our first average uses the import weights of only
those 3-digit items covered. This is "Weight A" in Table V-2. Our second
average, "Weight B," was computed by grouping the Wholesale Price Index
items into the two major groups of consumer goods imports by end-use,
durables and non-durables, and assigning each group the weight of the group
in total consumer goods imports.
The results are suggestive, although clearly they are nothing more than
crude indicators. The change in price for non-durables was more than 23
percent, while for durables the change was some 6 percentage points less. On
average the price rise facing purchasers of imported consumer goods at the
wholesale level was about 23 percent. In other words, about 55percentof the
devaluation was transmitted to domestic prices of imports for resale, resulting
in some restrictive pressure (via price) on imports.20
The average, however, conceals three distinct types of situations. For those
commodities that experienced no price change, there was some mopping up
of the licence premium, but licences remained the binding constraint post-
devaluation. For those that had a price change equal to the devaluation, there
was no licence premium pre-devaluation, and the devaluation was fully trans-
mitted to the ultimate domestic purchasers. For the intermediate situation, in
which the price rise was less than the devaluation, there was some pre-devalu-
ation licence premium, but this was entirely consumed, changing the binding
constraint from licences to price, assuming no significant change in the mag-
nitude of the dollar value of the licence issued. Hence for the second and
third types, the authorities were in a position to abandon licences and adopt a
liberalized approach for imports.21
Finally, two caveats are in order. We should note that our analysis con-
cerns only consumer goods which normally are imported and resold. It does
not apply to materials and equipment which frequently are directly imported
for own use. For such cases we had no way of measuring the "invisible"
licence premium arising from the quota restriction and the derived demand
curve for directly imported items, despite the fact that it would be absorbed
20. The Wholesale Price Index also contains a number of items falling in the import
categories of materials, equipment and fuels. Using the same procedure as for the
consumer goods, we calculated that the price change for raw and semifinished
materials was 19.86 percent, for capital equipment 36.33 percent, and for fuels and
lubricants 5.57 percent.
21. Note that the test of whether or not licences could be abandoned without affecting
the level of imports is not whether the scramble for licences by individual applicants
continues. Each importer's share is still affected by the licencing system if licences
are retained. This holds despite the fact that the constraint on total imports of a
given good is now price rather than licences.
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Table V-2
Changes in wholesale prices of importable commodities for resale following
1967 devaluation (percentages)






1. Non-durable consumer goods 93.65 87.58 23.68
2. Durable consumer goods 6.35 12.42 17.11
Weighted average —weightA 23.26
— weightB 22.86
Weighting within groups by SITC 3-digit commodity imports for 1966.
Weighting between groups:
Weight A —1966SITC 3-digit commodity imports of those items
covered -
WeightB —1966imports by end-use.
Sources:a.Weights within groups, and weight A between groups derived from 1966
import trade statistics, CBS, External Trade Statistics of Ghana, December
1966. Weight B from CBS, Economic Survey, 1969, imports by end-use.
b. Wholesale prices of individual commodities extracted from CBS Wholesale
Price Index monthly returns from respondents.
in all or part by the devaluation. Second, we have not dealt with the inevi-
table speculative demand for imports that arises in a licence-restricted system.
Whether or not this is affected by the devaluation depends crucially on the
expected course of liberalization, but since it is licence constrained, it cannot
be measured.
To sum up, the devaluation was approximately fully transmitted on the
export side. On the resale import side the domestic price response to the
devaluation was about 55 percent of the gross devaluation, within six months
of the devaluation.
(3) Relative prices of tradeables and domestic goods. What remains to be
considered is how the changes in the prices of tradeables compared with the
changes in the prices of domestic goods. Did relative prices change? Our
monthly data are limited to price indexes which have substantial elements of
importable items. The only component which is clearly not dominated by
importables is local foods. The monthly data for 1967 are set out in Table
V-3. There was a clear decline in local food prices following the devaluation,
with the overall result that the index was, on average, some fifteen points
lower in the five months following the devaluation than during the six
months preceding. While this was largely due to a good crop, the fact remains
that relative to this set of home goods the prices of tradeables rose in the
immediate post-devaluation period.
A similar picture emerges if we look at the National Accounts deflators,
Notes:122 Liberalization
Table V-3



















Average Jan.—June 175.6 158.5
Average Aug.—Dec. 160.5 154.2
Source:Economic Survey, 1967, p. 149.
which are available only on an annual basis. We again get a picture of home-
goods prices declining relative to tradeables. Recall from Table 11-10 that
when we isolate the domestic component of GDP, the deflator increased, but
by only 1.1 percent from 1966 to 1968, compared with substantially greater
rates of increase in the deflators for both exports and imports.
The available evidence, then, indicates that in the immediate post-devalua-
tion period relative domestic prices shifted in the following ways: (a) local
currency prices paid to export producers rose relative to the prices facing
domestic purchasers of imports and home goods; and (b) local currency prices
facing purchasers of imports declined relative to prices paid to export pro-
ducers, but rose relative to prices facing purchasers of home goods.
(b) Domestic expenditure
The domestic expenditure-output balance is also likely to be altered when
a devaluation occurs. It is important to note in this context that the Ghanaian
economy had been on a deflationary path for approximately twelve months
prior to the devaluation. As a result, the economy was in a position in which
much of the required cut in real income had taken place already. Devaluation
and accompanying policies would not be called upon to play a major role in
further deflating the economy.r
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The magnitude of the prior deflationary policies is difficult to estimate
precisely. What is clear is that in 1967 GDP in current prices was about 1
percent below the 1966 rate. This was primarily the result of a substantial cut
in the government deficit. The financial deficit had fallen from an annual rate
of approximately 101 million in the period January through June 1966 to
a rate of 61 million in the twelve months prior to the devaluation (see
Table V-5 below).
It is important to note also that the devaluation took place from a position
in which the potential foreign exchange deficit had been kept closed, in part,
by the system of exchange control and import licencing. The prior deflation
and limitation of imports together thus meant that the task of the devalua-
tion did not involve a substantial reduction of total real expenditure in gen-
eral, and actual imports in particular.22
There are two important aspects of the change in the domestic expendi-
ture-output balance when a devaluation occurs: (1) the direct effect of the
devaluation package on the levels of expenditure and output; and (2) the
fiscal and monetary policies accompanying devaluation. We begin with the
former, and examine the effects of the devaluation package on each of the
external and internal components of domestic expenditure.23
First, the devaluation increased the local currency value of domestic ex-
penditure on imports more than it increased the local currency payments on
exports, resulting in a net reduction of expenditure on domestic output. This
effect follows when we start from an initial situation of imbalance in which
imports exceed exports and wnen, in the short run, imports continue in
excess of exports. Thus when the Central Bank is selling foreign exchange net
to the public because imports exceed exports and the price of foreign ex-
change is increased, there is a net increase in the local-currency-denominated
sale of assets to the public, and purchasing power is mopped up. On the
import side, one must recall that we are unlikely to have any immediate
change in the level of imports. Commodities subject to strict licencing had
substantial quota premia and would continue at approximately the same level
in the short run, with the result merely that the premia were absorbed by the
devaluation. The licence recipients now had to pay a higher local currency
22. This is in contrast with the 1971 devaluation where a reduction of both domestic
expenditure and imports was called for. We take this up in sections 4 and S below.
23. See R.N. Cooper, "Currency Devaluation in Developing Countries," Princeton
Essays in International Finance, No.86, June 1971, for a useful discussion of the
problem in a more general context. Also, J.N. Bhagwati and A.O. Krueger take an
overview of this issue in the analytical framework for this series: ForeignTrade
Regimes and Economic Development: Experience and Analysis (publicationforth-
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price to the Bank of Ghana. The other commodities not subject to severe
licencing were largely "essential" imports which are price inelastic in demand.
The devaluation did not eat up a quota premium. Rather, because of the
inelasticity of demand the local-currency-denominated expenditure on these
commodities was increased in the same way as by the imposition of a sub-
stantial excise tax, again transferring local currency funds to the Bank of
Ghana. In the meantime, exports could not immediately respond. The Bank
of Ghana purchases of foreign exchange from the exports would tend to
offset the sales to importers, but because imports exceeded exports, the net
effect was one in which the Bank of Ghana was selling assets to the public.
Second, the net domestic output-expenditure balance was virtually un-
touched by the devaluation and accompanying measures: if anything, the
effect here was also deflationary. For one, by increasing the availability of
imported spare parts and raw materials via the expanded OGL list, domestic
producers were able to increase real domestic output. The evidence here is
confined to the industrial sector, where the annual data suggest a reasonable
recovery of value-added and gross output in 1968 over the stagnation of 1967
(Table V-4).
Domestic expenditure was also potentially subject to two other influences.
There could have been a money demand effect in which the public decreased
its spending in response to the higher prices of goods in order to restore the
real value of its money holdings. However, because the devaluation was one in
which quota premia were absorbed, and because exports are not consumed
locally, prices of tradeables facing consumers did not rise by the full propor-
tion of the devaluation. And due to the good harvest, prices of local foods
declined in the period following the devaluation. The overall effect on the
consumer price level was a slightly lower price level in the five months follow-
ing the devaluation than in the six months prior (see Table V-3 above).
Therefore, no immediate effect on the demand for money could be expected.
Table V-4
Gross output and value-added in industry at 1962 (in millions of new cedis)









Source:CBS,Indusrria!Sratistics, 19ob—1968, Accra, 1970.
j.r
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The"sweeteners" thrown into the devaluation package to make it more
acceptable were unusually small in the circumstances. In the face of a 43
percent devaluation, the 7.7 percent increase in the minimum wage and the
5.0 percent increase in government wages and salaries clearly were not
large.24
The devaluation package itself thus had, on balance, a deflationary effect
on the domestic economy. Yet an additional effort was made to dampen the
level of domestic expenditure. Apparently the authorities expected the li-n-
pact of the devaluation to be inflationary -Thisexpectation arose in part from
a failure to recognize the potentially deflationary effect of the devaluation in
the circumstances of the 1967 devaluation, together perhaps with the popular
confusion of a once-and-for-all price rise due to a tax or an exchange rate
adjustment and a price inflation due to excess money demand.
The compensating policies that were introduced centered on the govern.
ment deficit. The measure that most usefully sums up the overall situation is
the net increase in the financial claims on the government —i.e.,net govern-
ment borrowing —containedin Table V-5. From the austerity budget of
1966—1967, the deficit was cut further in the twelve months following the
July 1967 devaluation by about16.5 million (from N4 61.1 million to N4
44.6 million. Without a more complete macro model, it is difficult to say
whether this move was absolutely deflationary or simply less inflationary, in
any case, the direction of the effect is clear. It was not, however, a severe cut
back. The overall level of government current and capital expenditure was
approximately 380 million in fiscal year 1967_1968.25 The reduction in
the deficit was thus only 4.3 percent of total government expenditures.
To sum up, the combined effect of the devaluation package and the
government's fiscal policy does not appear to have been inflationary. On the
contrary, the initial conditions surrounding the devaluation suggest that the
24. Cooper, op.cit.,p. 16 ff.,lists a number of other effects which are frequently
important in developing countries' devaluations. These include:
(1) If the public had accumulated substantial inventories of goods in anticipation of
the expected price rise from a devaluation, total expenditure by the public could
drop until these excess inventories were depleted.
(2) If there were a substantial private debt denominated in foreign currency, the cia-
valuation could lead to serious bankruptcies.
(3) New investment in export industries now favored by the devaluation could lead
to an increased aggregate expenditure, but only if the real effect of the devaluation
is expected to last (which was somewhat uncertain).
None of these elements appear to have been significant in the case of the 1967
Ghanaian devaluation.
25. See: Republic of Ghana, Financial Statement, 1968—69.
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Table V-S
Central government financial receipts, payments and deficits, fiscal years 1965—1969







1965 (Jan.-Dec.) 110.4 32.0 78.4
1966 (Jan-June) 67.3 16.9 50.4 (= 100.8annual
rate)
1967 (July/66-June/67) 122.8 61.7 61.1
1968 (July/67-June/68) 80.4 35.8 44.6
1969 (July/68-June/69) 116.4 69.3 47.1
1970** (July/69-June/70) 88.3 29.9 54.4
Notes: *Thefiscal year was changed by the NLC government with transitional
half-year of Jan.-June 1966.
**Provisionalestimate.
Source:Republic of Ghana, Financial Statement, 1968—69, and 1970—7 1.
growth of excess demand for real resources by domestic residents was damp-
ened, and possibly even the absolute level of excess demand was reduced.
(c) Income distribution
A substantial shift in one major price, that of foreign exchange, inevitably
altered the distribution of income in the economy. The data available permit
us to consider only some broad aggregates:26 the distribution between the
export- and import-competing producers; and the distribution between
capital and labor.
(1) First, the relative price shifts noted in the preceding discussion suggest
that there was a significant shift in the relative distribution of income in favor
of export producers. Looking at the immediate price effect alone, and ig-
noring any subsequent quantity responses, we know that an across-the-board
change in the prices of output and inputs results in an equi-proportionate
change in the producers' per-unit value-added.27 Considering individual ex-
26. No data on distribution of income ny either income class or functional class are
available. Some pioneering work by Kodwo Ewusi on the distribution of income
among wage and salary employees covered by the CBS, Labour Statistics is reported
in his "Notes on the Relative Distribution of Income in Developing Countries,"
Review of Income and Wealth,Series17, No. 4, December 1971, pp. 371 —73. How-
ever, since this work refers to only one functional class, itis of limited value in
assessing the effect of devaluation on the distribution of income between functional
classes.
27. See J.C. Leith, "Across-the-Board Nominal Tariff Changes and the Effective Rate of
Protection," Economic Journal, Vol. LXXVIH,No. 123, December 1968.r
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portsectors, cocoa farmers had their output price increased by 30 percent,
and because their costs were little affected by the devaluation, were likely to
have experienced an even greater increase in their per-unit value-added. Minor
agricultural exports handled by the Cocoa Marketing Board were not affected
immediately. The mining and timber industries received slightly more than
the full benefit of the devaluation on the price of their output, and because
not all their inputs are imported, had their total input costs increased by less
than the rate of the devaluation, with the result that they benefited by more
than the rate of the devaluation.
The import-competing sector, largely consisting of producers of items not
classified as "essentials," had already received much of the price increase on
outputs due to the import licencing, although as we noted above, there ap-
pears to have been some increase in the price of importables accompanying
the devaluation. The rate of increase, however, was less than the propor-
tionate increase in costs for the highly import-intensive industries, with the
result that per-unit value-added for these activities did not increase by as
much as the devaluation.
On balance, therefore, we may conclude that on impact the devaluation
shifted the distribution of income in favor of existing export producers rela-
tive to import-competing producers.28
(2) A second question concerns the distribution of income between capital
and labor. If the production functions are Cobb—Douglas, changes in relative
factor prices are in the long run compensated by changes in factor techniques
resulting in constant income shares for capital and labor.29 In the short run,
however, a shift in relative factor prices does change the income distribution
for as long as the existing techniques of production remain in use. Hence, to
the extent that the devaluation altered relative factor prices, the distribution
of income was altered for the short run.
A careful study for the manufacturing sector by Michael Roemer30 con-
tains indexes for the wage—rental ratio over the period 1960—1970. The wage
28. This increase in "quasi rents" for exporters is of course the desired result of a
devaluation in order to induce a relative shift of resources into export production
and out of import-competing production. As resources shift, however, the quasi
rents in export activities will fall.
29. Therc ituIltejous proosemsassociated with the concept of an aggregate Cobb—
Douglas production function: e.g., that itis impossible to derive an aggregrate
production function which is independent of the prices of inputs and outputs. For a
helpful discussion see A.A. Walters, AnIntroduction to Econometrics, Macmillan,
1968, pp. 305-314. Our approach, however, is a useful first approximation of the
initial situation following a devaluation.
Michael Roemer, "Relative Factor Prices in Ghana Manufacturing," EconomicBul-
letin of Ghana, SecondSeries, Vol. 1, No.4, 1971.
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index Roemer employed was based on earnings in private manufacturing
establishments. It shows a substantial rise in the cost of employing a unit of
labor between 1960 and 1966, amounting to an average compound rate of
7.6 percent. His cost-of-employing-capital index takes into account the costs
of domestic and foreign financing, costs of factory construction, as well as
capital equipment costs. There was a gradual upward drift in the costs of
financing, costs of construction, and costs of equipment. However, the two
key policy variables, tariffs and the exchange rate, remained fixed through
the period 1960 to 1966. As a result, the cost.of.capital index rose much
more slowly than the wage index from 1960 to 1966, at about 3.8 percent
per annum. Overall, the wage.rental ratio stood about 25 percent higher in
1966 than in
The 1967 devaluation succeeded in returning the wage-rental ratio to
approximately the situation which prevailed in 1960. The wage index con-
tinued to rise in 1967, but the cost of capital was increased substantially by
the devaluation. Devaluation increased the local cost of foreign equipment
and, via the import component of construction costs, the cost of factory
construction. With the other components of the capital index maintaining
their previous trends, the cost-of-capital index jumped in 1967 to the point
that it roughly equalled the wage index for the same year. This evidence
suggests, therefore, that on impact the devaluation significantly increased the
relative cost of employing capital. In turn, this means that in the short run
(before production techniques change) the distribution of income in the
manufacturing sector was shifted relatively in favor of capital and against
labor. 32
A devaluation of the magnitude undertaken by Ghana in 1967 is a substan-
tial shock to many sectors of the economy. After several years of gradually
building up the disequilibrium excess demand, of containing it by other
measures,. and of the consequent redistribution of income, the sudden alter-
ation of relative prices in itself sets up new disequilibrium forces. If these are
in the right direction, the initial conditions created by the devaluation point
to a correction of the original excess demand. And what we have demon-
31. We are simply summarizing the broad trends of Roerner's findings, with the result
that we do not do justice to the careful detail of his analysis. He employs a variety
of alternative assumptions concerning the life of assets, the ratio of domestic to
foreign financing, and profits taxes. The details change with these alternatives, but
the principal conclusions concerning the rise in the wage-rental ratio through 1966
and the substantial drop due to the devaluation remain unaltered.
32. Beyond the initial impact, it is worth noting that in 1968 and 1969 the wage index
moved up faster than the cost-of-capital index, eroding about one-half of the effect
of the devaluation on the wage-rental ratio.
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stratedin this section is that on impact the 1967 devaluation introduced a set
of incentives which did in fact point the economy towards a reversal of its
balance payments difficulties, and eventually, perhaps, to move to a liberal-
ization of its international trade and payments regime. We turn now to a
discussion of just what in fact did occur in the first few years following
devaluation -
3.The medium-term effects of devaluation
Every Finance Minister who takes the momentous step of a major devalua-
tion must impatiently wait to see whether or not it works —particularlyif he
remains in office long enough. Our reading of the experience prior to the
1967 devaluation was that failure to control aggregate demand, and hence in
a licencing situation the domestic price level, was largely responsible for the
balance-of-payments difficulties (Chapter II, section 6). In the previous sec-
tion of this chapter we established that on impact the devaluation wrenched
relative prices in the appropriate direction and was on balance deflationary.
What remains to be seen is the subsequent response of the economy to the
sudden readjustment produced by the devaluation. A basic question which
must be answered is: did the devaluation make any significant difference to
the balance-of-payments picture? A related question is: was the pre-devalua-
tion experience a useful guide in predicting post-devaluation developments on
the export and import sides?
A simple procedure aimed at answering these questions is to compare the
actual export and import experience with the predicted, using the regression
results from Chapter II, section 6. Before doing so, it is important to note the
behavior of the variables in the years following devaluation. Aggregate de-
mand resumed its expansion in 1968. Following a minor decline in 1967, in
1968 GDP in current prices was up 15.3 percent over 1966. And in 1969 it
grew by a further 12.6 percent. Licencing was retained almost entirely intact
in 1967, with about 3 percentof imports allowed under Open General Li-
cence. Some liberalization occurred in 1968, and about 18.5 percent of im-
ports came under OGL (see Table V-i 1 below). Prices declined in 1967, but
the GDP deflator jumped in 1968 to a level 113 percent greater than 1966,
and by an additional 8.8 percent in 1969. With no new changes in the nomi-
nal effective exchange rate facing non-cocoa exports, by 1968 the price-
deflated rate fell to a level equal to that of 1964, and continued its decline
during 1969.
These developments are of considerable significance, for it was not the
devaluation alone that was at work over the medium term. Other key deter-
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ticprices —werealso acting, but in the opposite direction to the devaluation.
Consider now the responses of exports and imports to the devaluation and
these subsequent developments (Table V-6).
(a) Non-cocoa exports
For non-cocoa exports, the change in the real effective exchange rate was
substantial when compared with previous year-to-year changes. To respond
fully to such a large change would undoubtedly require new investment, but
new investment would be forthcoming only if it were clear that the devalua-
tion in real terms was going to stick. As a result, the response was slower to
emerge than the smaller year-to-year changes would suggest; in the first full
year of 1968—1969 the response to the 1968 real effective exchange rate
yielded an actual value of non-cocoa exports in constant prices of
85.3 million compared with a predicted value of 93.5 million. In the
second year, 1969—1970, the actual response to the 1969 real effective ex-
change rate was much closer to the predicted, with the shortfall amounting to
only 3.2 percent of the predicted.
As a check on the predictive power of our estimated equation we reran the
regression for the entire period 196 1—1962 through 1969—1970 with a sepa-
rate dummy variable set equal to unity for each year after 1966—1967. This
procedure reveals the extent to which the original regression tracked in the









where Dl 1for 1967—1968 and zero for all other years, D.2 =1for
1968—1969 and zero for all other years, Di =1for 1969—1970 and zero for
all other years. The dummy for 1969—1970 is insignificant, indicating that by
then the relationship between the price-level-deflated effective exchange rate
and non-cocoa exports was not significantly different from the previous rela-
tionship. However, the dummy variables for the two earlier years are signifi-
cantly negative.
The failure of non-cocoa exports to rapidly reach their predicted levels
merits an additional comment. First, the British devaluation of 16 percent in
November 1967 reduced the effect of the Ghanaian devaluation in that mar-
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ket.Second, there were a number of difficulties encountered internally by
potential exporters, particularly the timber export trade. Bottlenecks in rail
transportation and at the port of Takoradi were frequent.33 And until 1969,
there were continuing complaints from timber producers about their diffi-
culties in obtaining licences for equipment and spare parts from the import
licence authorities. Third, the depletion of natural resource deposits (gold,
diamonds, and manganese particularly) may have limited or prevented re-
sponse to the increased effective exchange rate.34
Whether or not the devaluation could be termed a success in stimulating
non-cocoa exports depends largely on the basis chosen for comparison. If the
basis selected is a before—after comparison, the performance showed only a
minor improvement: non-cocoa exports had by 1969—1970 only approxi-
mately reestablished the level of 1965—1966.
However, when both the exchange rate and the price level changes are
taken inte'account,the response was approximately what could have been
expected on the basis of previous experience. By 1969—1970 the risein the
domestic price level had absorbed much of the effect of the devaluation, and
the real effective exchange rate was approaching that of 1965. A more ap-
propriate basis for comparison, however, is the situation in the absence of the
devaluation. Our fit of equation (11.6) yields a predicted constant price value
of non-cocoa exports of76.8 million for 1969—1970 at the old official
exchange rate compared with the actual 87.3 million.35 In other words,
given the inflation, the devaluation yielded an increase of non-cocoa exports
amounting to about 10 million or 14 percent over what would have been
otherwise achieved for 1969—1970. In this connection it is important to recall
the conclusion from section 2b above: on impact the combined effects of the
devaluation package and the government's fiscal policy was not inflationary.
Hence the inflation emerged after the devaluation had its initial impact, and
was not an immediate consequence of the devaluation but was, as we argue
later, attributable to subsequent, post-1967, expansionary policies.
(b) Cocoa exports
The effect of the devaluation on cocoa earnings is difficult to evaluate
fully without a detailed econometric model of cocoa supply and demand. The
33. See Nathan Consortium for Sector Studies, Ports Study: Transport, 1970, Annex V.
34. This effect is more complex. Absolute depletion would, of course, prevent any
response to increased price. Increased marginal costs due to lower-grade veins would,
if occurring simultaneously, give the appearance of lower response to the higher 3
price. However, the elasticity for a given price and marginal cost curve increases as
the marginal cost curve shifts upward.
35. At the old exchange rate of0.7 14 per dollar, the price-deflated effective ex-
change rate for non-cocoa exports would have been 0.363 per dollar.
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importantissues, however, are reasonably clear. Given the prices and market
share at the time of the devaluation, the short- to medium-term response ratio
of output to a change in the real producer price would have been about 0.17
(see section 2a). And given a medium- to long-run demand elasticity (absolute-
ly) in excess of —1,we can evaluate the effect of the 30 percent increase in
the nominal producer price accompanying devaluation on both output and
earnings over the medium term of about three years.
The increase in the nominal producer price from Ntj 5.00 to6.50 per
headload which accompanied the devaluation could be expected to have the
following effects. The short- to medium-term response would, in the absence
of domestic price inflation, result in additional output on the crder of about
6 percent. However, within three years the domestic price level wiped out the
nominal producer price increase, with the result that the net effect on output
and hence earnings was nil. Thus the circumstances surrounding the devalua-
tion did not have a significant sustained effect on medium-term output or
earnings from cocoa. It is however important to note that without the devalu-
ation, which permitted the increased producer price without loss of govern-
ment revenue, the continued rise in the domestic price level would have
resulted in some medium-term declines in output.
While the policies accompanying devaluation resulted in little if any im-
pact in the medium term, the long-term consequences for cocoa were far
more serious. The long-run capacity, which requires time for new plantings to
mature, is to a much greater extent affected by the real producer price than
short-term output. Further, to induce new plantings, the real producer price
must be above some minimum planting effort level. In terms of the 1967—1968
deflator, the minimum nominal producer price for new plantings was about
9.00 per 60-pound headload.36 However, the price rise from N4 5.00 to
NC 6.50 perheadload accompanying the devaluation was not enough to reach
the NC 9.00 minimum required at that time, with the result that there was no
effect on long-run capacity. This perpetuated a zero plantings state that had
persisted since 1964, with the predictable consequence of stagnating output
in the 1970's.
The negligible impact of the devaluation does not mean that cocoa output
and earnings remained unchanged. On the contrary, substantial changes in
output and earnings did occur over the next few calendar years (Table V-7).
The peak output of the 1964—1965 season is reflected in the high 1965
36. Bateman's recent work, "Cocoa Study," in EconomicReport,Vol. IV, mimeograph,
Washington, D.C., March 1972, indicates a minimum real producer price of 198
per ton to induce plantings in 1967—196 8. This can be thought of as the intercept
on the real price axis. Or course, as with any fitted function, actuai observations
will be scattered around the fit.
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Table V-7
Exports of cocoa and cocoa products, 1965—1970 (quantities, thousands of long tons;













1965 494 136.5 21 0.9 21 11.4 148.8208.3
1966 392 103.1 24 1.2 39 11.5 115.8 162.1
1967 A267 100.8 12 0.8 10 8.0 109.6 153.4
1967 B 63 29.9 12 1.7 13 14.5 46.0 45.1
1967 330 130.7 24 2.5 23 22.5 155.6 198.5
1968 330 185.6 23 4.5 20 24.1 214.1 209.8
1969 303 218.6 19 3.3 18 24.0 246.0 241.1
1970 362 300.4 17 3.9 17 27.3 331.6 325.0
Notes: *Itemsmay not acid to total due to rounding.
**ConVersion from to $at$1.40/N4 1965 through 1967A, and at
1967B (July—December) through 1970.
Sources:1965-1969, Economic Survey, 1969; 1970, External Trade Statistics, Decem-
ber 1970; breakdown of 1967, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1967.
1967A refersto January through June; 1967B refers to July through
December.
calendar year sales volume. Subsequently the sales volume continuously de-
clined until 1970, reflecting in large part the continuing decline in the real
producer pricein the mid-1950's, and the poor rainfall effect on the
1968—1969 season. Earnings in dollar terms, however, reached the 1965 level
by 1968, and increased again in 1969. Output in 1969—1970 rose substantial-
ly, responding to the capacity additions of the late 1950's and early 1960's,
together with current good weather and further increases in the producer
price (to 7.00 for the 1968—1969 crop and8.00 for the 1969—1970
crop) affecting output from existing capacity.
The revenue received from the post-devaluation sales was considerably in
excess of what could normally have been expected. During the entire period
from the bumper crop of 1964—1965 through 1970 the world cocoa market
was in an unsettled situation. Not since the Korean war boom had the market
taken so long to adjust to a new equilibrium. For Ghana the very serious price
weakness of 1966 was followed by recovery in 1967 and 1968 to approxi-
mately the prices which the current actual volume would suggest. The price
rise continued to 1969 and 1970, despite the fact that the decline in Gha-
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creasedby about 20 percent. Ghana thus reaped a substantial windfall of
cocoa receipts.37
(c) Imports
Turning to imports, our estimated equation describing the behavior of the
import system takes into account only GOP and licencing, but not the price.
level-deflated effective exchange rate facing importers, because the latter was
not a restraining influence on imports during the period of licencing. It is
conceivable that with the devaluation the price-level-deflated effective ex-
change rate could again become an active restraint on imports. However, it is
clear from Table 11-8 that the 1968 rate was considerably lower than the last
few years before licencing was imposed. Consequently, even after devaluation
it probably did not significantly affect the level of aggregate imports.
The growth of nominal GDP in 1968 and 1969 created pressure on the
import system to increase the level of imports. The system responded to the
pressure in much the same way as the pre-devaluation experience would
suggest. Projecting our estimated equation (11.7) into the post-devaluation
period yields predicted imports less than 3 percent higher than the actual
imports for the years 1968 and 1969 (Table V.6). Performing a check similar
to our check on the export equation, we re-ran the import equation (which
was based on data covering 1955 through 1966) for the full period 1955
through 1969 with an additional dummy for each year after 1966. The result
was:







None of the dummy variables is significant, with the t value for the 1969
where DLIC =Ifor all years when licicensing was enforced (1962, 1963,
1964, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969) and zero for all other years; Dl =1for 1967
and zero for all other years; =Ifor 1968 and zero for all other years; D3
=1for 1969 and zero for all other years.
dummy being particularly small. We may therefore conclude that GDP in
37. The windfall of 1970 is discussed in more detail in section 4below.136 Liberalization
current prices and the licencing dummy of the pre.devaiuation experience
continued to explain the level of imports in the post-devaluation period. The
system governing imports does not appear to have changed significantly with
the devaluation.
(d) Capital flows
The remaining major item that might be expected to respond to the deval-
uation is autonomous capital flows, both private and official. As noted in
Chapter II, prior to the devaluation private direct investment was felt not to
be responding to the more favorable climate created by the National Libera-
tion Council, and donor countries were not anxious to support an untenable
balance-of-payments situation. The devaluation was expected to have a favor-
able effect on both. To sort out the facts, we have enumerated in Table V-8
the various sources of capital inflows (gross, not net) over the period 1965
through 1968.
Private capital inflows fluctuated substantially over the period. The major
source of variation is investment by the Volta Aluminum Company (Valco).
The timing here relates to the bringing into production of a smelter associated
with the completion of the Volta Dam. Official capital inflow for the Volta
River Authority (VRA), which built the dam, shows a similar time pattern for
the same reason. Further, the Valco agreement provides for an enclave type
of activity; investment, repatriation of funds, imports, and exports are all
carried out in dollars at the company's own discretion. The entire operation
may be considered largely as an electricity export contract denominated in
dollars. Consequently, the Valco inflow in Table V.8 has little to do with the
exchange rate, or for that matter with any other Ghanaian policy short of
contract abrogation. Of major interest then is the total excluding Valco. This
exhibits no substantial difference in dollar terms between the year before
(1966) and the year after (1968) devaluation.38
It would be unwise to draw any strong conclusions from this limited set of
data. Itis simply suggestive of the sort of argument that appears in the
literature on foreign investment; the exchange rate is only one of many kinds
of influences on private capital flow. Most of the other influences, such as
38. One might also want to exclude from consideration reinvested profits on the
grounds that such reinvestment is largely due to exchange control regulations block-
ing full remittance of profits; and the private suppliers' credits could be excluded
because they are usually denominated in a foreign currency. This leaves only the
"others" category, including direct investment —whichalso shows little change
between 1966 and 1968.
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Table V-8
Private and official capital inflows, 1965—1968 (in millions of US dollais)
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1965 1966 1967 1968
Private
Reinvested profits 13.4 12.6 12.6 8.4
Valco 23.2 40.9 16.9 2.6
Private suppliers' credits — — 2.9 3.9
Others 0.3 6.2 5.6 5.8
Total 38.4 59.6 38.0 20.8
Total excluding Valco 15.1 18.8 21.2 18.1
Official
OECD donors — 7.8 15.0 39.3
Suppliers' credits 82.9 30.8 9.1 0.2
Volta River Authority 19.3 14.8 2.7
Others 2.8 0.8 0.3 0.6
Total 105.0 54.3 27.1 40.1
Total excluding suppliers'
credits & VRA 2.8 8.7 15.3 39.9
Sources:1965 and 1966: Republic of Ghana, Ghana's Economy and Aid Requirements
in 1967. Accra, May 1967. Converted from pre-devaluation at rate
1967 and 1968: Republic of Ghana, Ghana's Economy andAid Requirements
January 1969—June 1970. Accra, March 1969. Converted from post-devalua-
tionrate0.98/N4.
ability to repatriate profits, are not directly affected by the exchange rate.
Hence a devaluation alone is unlikely to produce a noticeable increase in the
private capital inflow. And it evidently did not for Ghana.
Official capital flows, paradoxically, are more sensitive to the exchange
rate. Determined in part by the development "needs" of the recipient but
also in part by the donor's sense of the appropriateness of the recipient's
policies, they are affected to a substantial degree by the visible measurable
policy changes in the "correct" direction. A devaluation in the face of bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties is taken as a clear signal that the "appropriate"
economic policies are being followed and hence that the country is deserving
of support. This was in part the view taken by major OECD donor countries
in response to the Ghanaian 1967 devaluation. A moderate inflow for 1966
to support the new NLC government was doubled in 1967 and more than
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redoubled in The official expectations were thus substantially real-
ized.40
The gain from increased official capital inflows was in serious danger of
being swamped by large repayments falling due on siihstantial medium-term
suppliers' credits contracted by the Nkrumah government. Some relief had
been obtained in a December 1966 debt-rescheduling agreement covering
payments due through December 1968.41 However, by not changing the debt
schedule for 1969 and later years, a substantial hump for 1969 remained,
with over 80 million or about 20 percent of exports falling due in that
year.
Facing the prospect of a major debt repayment burden in 1969, Ghana
turned to her creditors a second time in October 1968. Again only limited
relief was obtained. This time medium-term debts due from January 1, 1969
through June 30, 1972 were shifted forward to the period 1974-1981.
The original medium-term debt schedule is compared with the revised
1966 schedule and the 1968 schedule in Table V-9 on the assumption that no
new debt is incurred. The net result of the two reschedulings was to provide
immediate relief for 1966 and 1967 and, in the years 1968 through 1971, a
47 percent cut in payments falling due. In the new schedule, however, the
situation reverses by 1972, with higher payments falling due from then on.
And because of moratorium interest on the rescheduled amount of about 6
percent per annum, the total payments were increased by about 25 percent.
The medium-term suppliers'-credit debts were clearly the most pressing,
but by no means the only debts facing Ghana. Short-term debts in the form
of tirrears, trade credits, bank loans, and net IMF position were also falling
due, together with a long.term debt arising from major capital projects under-
taken in the past, such as the Volta Dam. .Even after the 1968 rescheduling of
medium-term debts, the overall schedule on existing debts for 1969 through
1981 promised little relief for the 1970's (see Table V-b). The somewhat
niore sympathetic attitude of donors in the 18 months following the 1967
39. At the same time reliance on official suppliers' credits was almost completely aban-
doned.
40. The actual inflow data probably overstate the increased commitments because the
lag between commitment and utilization was being reduced as the Ghanaian author-
ities became more familiar with the intricacies of aid administration.
41. Payments on approximately 180 millionof outstanding medium-term debt
fallingdue between July 1, 1966 and December 31, 1968— plusarrears accumulated f
prior to July 1, 1966— were consolidated. Eighty percent of the consolidated amount
was shifted to the period 1972-to-l979, with 20 percent to be paid between July 1,
a
1966and December 31, 1968. These and other details are taken from Norman L.
Hicks, 'Debt Rescheduling and Economic Growth in Ghana," USA ID Mission to
Ghana, Research Memorandum No. 8, Accra, May 1969.The Medium-term Effects of Devaluation 139
Table V-9
Medium-term debt schedules (in millions of new cedis post-devaluation)





1966 52.7 8.1 8.1 44.6 44.6
1967 64.5 8.6 8.6 55.9 55.9
1968 63.1 29.2 29.2 33.9 33.9
1969 59.0 82.6 33.9 —23.6 25.1
1970 50.5 58.8 22.6 —8.3 27.9
1971 37.8 49.5 26.6 —11.7 11.2
1972 21.1 37.3 38.3 —16.2 —17.2
1973 14.4 335 41.2 —19.1 —26.8
1974 10.9 32.6 44.8 —11.7 —33.9
1975 5.6 31.0 49.1 —25.4 —43.5
1976 3.8 31.5 53.6 —27.7 —49.8
1977 2.5 31.3 52.4 —28.8 —49.9
1978 1.6 31.8 52.0 —30.2 —50.6
1079 0.7 15.5 343 —14.8 —34.0
1980 0.7 0.7 27.4 0.0 —26.7
1981 — — 24.6 0.0 —24.6
Total 436.8 482.0 547.1 —45.2 —110.3
devaluation had provided Ghana with some temporary relief from the imme-
diate pressure arising for 1969, together with a relatively smooth debt sched-
ule for the 1970's. However, Ghana did not obtain any substantial cancella-
tion of debts.
To sum up, in the medium-term the devaluation did affect the merchan-
dise trade account by about the magnitudes expected from previous expe-
rience. The devaluation, however, could not and did not do more than that.
Resumption of gradual domestic price inflation was eroding the effect of the
devaluation for both non-cocoa and cocoa exports, and the pull of aggregate
demand was continuing to raise the level of imports. In a before-after com-
parison, the net merchandise balance for 1968 and 1969 was little different
from the situation of 1962 or 1964. It is important to note, however, that the
merchandise balance would have shown a substantially greater deficit in the
absence of the devaluation.
On capital account the only noticeable change following devaluation was a
somewhat more sympathetic view by the donor countries, which materialized
in the form of increased aid flows and a smoothing of the debt schedule.
Source:Norman L. Hicks, "Debt Rescheduling and Economic Growth in Ghana," US
AID Mission to Ghana, ResearchMemorandum No. 8,Accra, 1969.
1
SYear Short-term Medium-termLong-term Total
1969 30.9 33.9 15.0 79.8
1970 52.8 22.6 15.2 90.6
1971 44.7 26.6 16.4 87.7
1972 26.3 38.3 17.3 81.9
1973 16.1 41.2 19.1 76.4
1974 11.6 44.8 20.4 76.8
1975 9.6 49.1 21.8 80.5
1976 8.6 53.6 22.2 84.4
1977 4.5 52.4 22.4 79.3
1978 4.5 52.0 23.3 78.8
1979 4.5 34.7 23.6 62.8
1980 4.5 27.4 23.3 55.2
1981 24.6 22.7 51.8
Notes:Short-term includes arrears, trade credits, IMF and bank loans. Otticial
suppliers' credits only considered under medium-term. Long-term includes
private suppliers' credits. This schedule refers to the situation after the 1968
rescheduling.
Source:Norman L. Hicks, op.cit.
Overall,the medium-term result of the devaluation was largely one of
preventing further deterioration. The substantial readjustment necessary for a
sustained liberalization did not emerge. Yet the NLC government had com-
mitted itself to a limited liberalization. As General Afrifa had declared in his
devaluation announcement: "It is as you know the firm objective of the NLC
to free our foreign trade payments from all artificial restrictions and con-
trols."42 The Progress Party government elected in 1969 was committed toa
more sweeping dismantling of the control system.43 Were these commitments
to he honored, and if so in what way?
4. The import liberalization experience, 1967—19 70 (Phase IV and
return to Phase I)
Import liberalization began almost immediately after the devaluation and
continued an uneven but uninterrupted expansion tnrough the next four and
one-half years. The attempt was cautious. Expansion of the OGL list was
42. Reproduced in, Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the Financial Year Ended
30 June, 1968, p. 43. This was somewhat qualified by the far more restricted
commitment to place a very limited list of items on OGL.
43. See quotation from the Progress Party Manifesto, note 1 above.
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Table V-b
Short-, medium-, and long-term debt schedule (in millions of new cedis)The Import Liberalization Experience, 1967— 1970 141
spreadover several years. Begun by the National Liberation Council (military)
government, it was continued by the elected Progress Party government of
Prime Minister K.A. Busia which took office in October 1969. A commitment
to liberalization was an important component of the Progress Party's plat-
form, and during its 27 months in office the Busia government continued to
move towards total liberalization of imports.
The drive towards import liberalization appeared, on the surface at least,
to be successful. For the first three and one-half years the trade balance did
not move into a serious deficit position. And there was an increased reliance
on price instruments rather than quantitative restrictions to control imports.
As licences were removed from substantial portions of the import bill, sur-
charges on de-licensed imports were introduced. Initially then the import
liberalization appeared to be designed to substitute price for quantitative
restriction of imports. A further resort to price instruments came in the form
of an announced subsidy for nontraditional exports.
In the latter stages of the liberalization, however, it became apparent that
the objective was to increase the level of imports —anobjective far more
difficult to sustain in the absence of continued export growth. The initial
success of the liberalization in increasing imports was due not so much to the
underlying strength of the situation as to an unusual set of external circum-
stances. Foreign-exchange receipts were buoyed by exceptional cocoa earn-
ings and substantial aid flows, plus debt.service relief.
When these external factors, particularly the cocoa market, adjusted to
normal levels in 1971 it became obvious that a severe cut in imports was
necessary. In a desperate move to correct the enormous imbalances that had
arisen, a massive devaluation of nearly 80 percent was undertaken at the end
of December 1971. This proved to be the final straw for large segments of the
population already restive with the Busia government. Colonel 1K. Acheam-
pong and his associates led a successful military coup in mid-January 1972.
The new government revalued the exchange rate, wiping out two-thirds of the
devaluation, repudiated some of the suppliers'-credit debt, unilaterally re-
scheduled much of the remainder, and reinstated strict import licencing. The
import liberalization was finished.
In this section we trace the major developments during the liberalization
episode in order to sort out their precise nature, timing and magnitude. This
will enable us to consider in the next section the successes, failures, and
neglect present in the Ghanaian liberalization experiment.
The OGL system for imports was the major vehicle of the liberalization. A
small but crucial step in expanding the OGL list had been made in late 1966.
Following a policy declaration which noted, among other points, that the aim
of the government was not to continue these controls permanently but rather142 Liberalization
to have most essential commodities imported on OGL,44 specific additions
were made to the OGL list for 1967 which broke with the past. Up to this
point the OGL list was largely confined to personal items and minor border
trade. The list for 1967, however, added specified pharmaceuticals, fertilizers,
hand tools for cultivation, fishing gear and a few industrial materials. The list
was not long, and the total volume of imports under OGL in 1967 amounted
to only 3,15 percent of total imports (see Table V-il below). This was the
first time since 1961 that the OGL was deliberately expanded and not quick-
ly reduced again.
The devaluation announcement reaffirmed the intention to liberalize, and
specifically to "include on OGL virtually all industrial and agricultural spare
parts and chemicals, nearly all pharmaceuticals, and In the
next month, regulations for 1968 were published which contained these and
other major additions to the OGL list,46 with the result that 1968 OGL
imports amounted to 18.5 percent of a substantially increased total import
bill.
The following year, when regulations were announced for 1969, a further
substantial addition was made to the OGL list. Again the result was an in-
creased volume of imports under OGL: some 27.8 percent of an enlarged
import bill. With this substantial portion of imports contemplated under
OGL, the policy makers recognized that some dampening of the demand for
delicenced imports would be necessary. The result was a surcharge on most
OGL imports introduced in February The surcharge rate, however,
was low: only 5 percent of the c.i.f. value.
The last budget of the Liberation Council government was pre-
sented to the country in July 1969 by J.H. Mensah, Commissioner of Fi-
nance.48 The budget placed considerable emphasis on export promotion.
44. Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, 7 October 1966.
45. General Africa, reproduced in the Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board for the
Financial Year Ended 30 June, 1968, p. 42.
46. For the first time, apparently, the OGL list, as well as the restricted list, was defined
in terms of the SITC trade classification.
47. National Liberation Council, Decree 325, Gazetted 13 February, 1969. Exceptions
to the surcharge were household effects, single copies of printed matter, pets,
pharmaceuticals, textbooks, and fish caught by Ghanaian-owned vessels.
48. Mensafl, trained at the London School of Economics and Stanford University, was
regarded as one of the most promising and capable economists available to the
government. His previous experience included four years on the faculty of the
University College of the Gold Coast (now the University of Ghana), three years as
an economist at UN Headquarters, followed by four years (1961—65) in the National
Planning Commission, Accra, where he was the leading architect of the Seven Year
Development Plan. He then went to the UN Economic Commission for Africa,
returning to Ghana as Commissioner of Finance in April 1969.•The Import Liberalization Experience, 1967—1970 143
Schemeswere announced which would provide exporters of manufactures
(except products of the woodworking and metal processing industries) with:
rebates of up to 50 percent of their company tax liability; a cash bonus of 10
percent on incremental exports; replacement of licences on imported mate-
rials used; and drawback of duties and indirect taxes on materials used for
export. Also announced was a subsidy of one-third of the internal transporta-
tion costs of moving secondary species of timber to harbor for export or
elsewhere for processing or sale in the local market.
While of limited scope, these schemes could have resulted in a significant
incentive to the eligiblefirms. However, administrative complications or
delays in implementation made all of them inoperative from the firms' view-
point. The procedures for drawbacks on indirect taxes and duties, and the
procedures for obtaining export licences were so complex that only large
firms could hope to cope, let alone find it profitable to participate.49 The
export bonus scheme was not enacted until April 1971, some 21 months after
announcement, the delay apparently being due to "the long drawn-out discus-
sions" with the IMF.50 And the timber transport subsidy scheme had still not
been implemented by the time of the 1970 budget a year later.5 1
The process of import liberalization was continued with the announce-
ment in September 1969 of the OGL list for 1970. The elected Progress Party
government, which took office shortly thereafter, retained the list until the
budget for fiscal year 1970/71 was presented in August 1970, except for the
addition of some "essential" food items in March 1970. The result for the
first 8 months of 1970 was 39.4 percent of all imports coming under OGL.
The first budget of the Progress Party government was presented to Parlia-
ment in August 1970 by J.H. Mensah, now Busia's Minister of Finance. This
marked a renewed drive towards liberalization in fulfillment of the Progress
Party commitment to eventually abandon licencing.52 Almost 60 percent of
all imports for the remainder of the year came under the new OGL listing.
Mensah also renewed the policy of surcharges on OGL imports, but aban-
doned the single rate. Instead, he introduced surcharges on most OGL im-
ports, with rates which varied from 5 percent to 150 percent of c.i.f. value.
Items subject to surcharge were automatically placed on OGL, although not
49. This was partially admitted even by J.H. Mensah, now Minister of Finance, in his
1970 Budget Statement, Accra, 25 August, 1970. On the drawbacks, he noted, "...so
far very few applications have been received..." (p. 34). With respect to the com-
pany tax rebate, he said, "It has been decided this year to add to these tax incen-




52. SeeProgressParry Manifesto, op. cit., p. 5.144 Liberalization
all OGL items were subject to surcharge. The rationale of the differentiated
surcharges was apparently a combination of a desire to capture for govern.
ment revenues the quota premia on newly freed imports, together with a
recognition that the demand for such imports had to be dampened.53 The
full protective consequences were apparently not taken into account prior to
the budget.54
An instrument employed to achieve more than one objective, as the sur-
charge was, is bound to encounter serious difficulties in achieving all the
objectives assigned to it. Such was the case with the differentiated surcharges.
They do not appear to have had a major dampening effect on imports, did
not generate a substantial additional revenue, and considerably altered the
protective structure.
The additional collections of surcharges amounted to only approximately
7.3 milfon during the rest of 1970, or 5.4 percent of total imports and
8.9 percent of OGL imports for September through December 1970. This is a
rough estimate arrived at by assuming that the January-through-August 1970
rateaveraged the same as1969. (Surcharge collections inall of 1970
amounted to 10.7 mihionL)
We have seen the jumbled protective consequences of this in Chapter Ill
above. The surcharges substantially increased the protection of some indus-
tries, but many others had their protection reduced —someto the extent that
previously positive protection was turned into negative protection. Con-
sumers and industrial users of commodities subject to substantial surcharges
were quick to complain. Some minor adjustments were made, but the widely
differentiated structure remained intact.
An administrative change introduced in August 1970 also involved a
loosening of OGL. Commitment forms for OGL were abandoned. These had
been used since 1967 and were ostensibly designed to ensure that where
possible commodity aid would be utilized rather than OGL. Commitment
forms were issued by the licencing authorities on application to cover most
commercial imports available under OGL. This enabled the licencing authori-
ties to keep tabs on OGL imports and to increase utilization of commodity
aid. To our knowledge, it was not used deliberately to restrict imports, but by
its nature did involve an administrative hinderance.
A further change announced in the 1970 budget was an increase from
percent to 5 percent in the interest rate on Post Office Savings deposits.
Although postal savings were not large, this move represented an important
break with the past neglect of incentives to save. Implementation was some-
53. See Budget Statement for 1970—1971, Accra, 25 August, 1970.
54. The most serious omission was a failure to recognize fully the cost-increasing effect
of surcharges on inputs for firms which received no additional protection of output.
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Table V-il
Open general licence imports, 1967—1970
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Group Value (millions of new cedis)
1967 1968 1969 1970A**1970B**1970
0 Food and live animals 6.86 6.35 8.94 37.4423.53 60.97
1Beverages and tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Crude materials,
inedible 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.39 0.40
3 Mineral fuels
and lubric. 0.04 0.35 0.35 0.72 — 0.72
4 Animal and veg.
oils and fats 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 and pharm.0.67 20.4433.56 27.2712.65 39.92
6 Manufactured goods0.14 4.7317.80 13.4812.42 25.90
7 Machinery and transport
equip. 0 22.7931.48 26.2524.84 51.09
8 Misc. manufactured
articles 0.26 0.34 2.27 2.32 1.50 3.82
9 Misc. n.e.s. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 8.00 55.04 94.46 107.4975.33 182.82
Group Percentage composition of OGL
1967 1968 1969 1970A**1970B**1970
0 Food and live animals 85.75 11.54 9.46 34.83 31.24 33.35
1Beverages and tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Crude materials,
inedible 0.375 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.52 0.22 '
3 Mineral fuels
and lubric. 0.50 0.64 0.37 0.67 0 0.39
4 Animal and veg.
oils and fats 0 0 0 0 0 0
5
and pharm. 8.37537.1435.5325.37 16.79 21.84
6 Manufactured goods 1.75 8.59 18.84 12.54 16.49 14.17
7 Machinery and
transport equip. 0 41.41 33.33 24.4232.97 27.95
8 Misc. manufactured
articles 3.25 0.62 2.40 2.16 1.99 2.09
9 Misc. n.e.s. 0 0 0 0 0 0




Group Percentage of all imports *
1967 1968 1969 1970B**1970
0 Food and live animals15.88 12.45 16.2072.43 84.65 76.72
1 Beverages and tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Crude materials,
inedible 0.82 0.64 1.11 0.22 12.04 4.25
3 Mineral fuels
and lubric. 0.26 1.63 1.53 4.34 0 2.96
4 Animal and veg.
oilsandfats 0 0 0 0 0 0
S Chemicals *
and pharm. 2.6266.02 83.6887.85 70.86 81.64
6 Manufactured goods 0.19 6.20 18.27 18.6843.24 25.68
7 Machinery and
transport equip. 0 26.51 33.31 34.9974.95 47.25
8 Misc. manufactured
articles 1.69 2.44 15.5520.8928.48 23.33
9 Misc. n.e.s. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3.15 18.55 27.83 39.3658.84 45.58
1'
Notes: *OGLand total imports exclude Valco imports of aluminum. Excluded from
OGL imports are several minor items such as headloads of foodstuffs, single
copies of books and periodicals and some spare parts which are not separately
identified in the External Trade Statistics.
**1970Arefers to January through August, and 1970B refers to September
through December, to take into account a major expansion of OGL from
August 25, 1970.
Source:Compiled from OGL lists published in Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, and
corresponding import values recorded in External Trade Statistics.
what slower than the "immediate effect" promised in the budget speech: ten
months passed before the increase took effect.
The import liberalization approach was selective in its incidence. Given the
gradualist strategy adopted, and the differentiated compensating taxes (sur.
charges) on OGL, no other option appeared viable. The result was substantial
variation in the proportion of OGL imports by major groups (see Table
V-li). By the end of 1970,70 percent or more of food, pharmaceuticals, and
machinery imports were on OGL.55
55. Further, most fuels and lubricants were licenced in name only, with the volume of
licencing based on actual demand. Hence SITC section 3 was also in effect almost
completely liberalized.
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Fromthe perspective of late 1970, substantial progress had been achieved
in liberalizing imports in the three years since devaluation. This had been
made possible, in large part, by exceptionally large foreign-exchange receipts
from cocoa and from aid donors. While the latter could be expected to
continue for a few more years, the cocoa market windfall of 1970 could not.
In the post-Korean boom period a significant and relatively stable negative
relationship between Ghana's cocoa volume and price had existed. Such a
relationship provides a useful device both for evaluating the extent to which
current cocoa receipts are normal, and for forecasting expected receipts on
the basis of crop reports. While such an exercise was not, to our knowledge,
explicitly undertaken, it is useful to do so in order to illustrate the approxi-
mate magnitude of the windfall of foreign-exchange receipts for 1970 and the
adjustment necessary in 1971.
One such relationship between cocoa volume and price is:
In (V.1)
where:
CXVI, =indexof cocoa-bean export volume
=indexof cocoa-bean export price
Using annual data for the period 1955 through 1969,56 we obtained the
following fit:





In turn, substituting the actual volume index of 89 for 1970, we obtain a
predicted price index of 107, compared with the actual index of 173. Trans-
lated into values, this means that the actual 1971 receipts of $ 294.4 million
for bean exports alone were $ 112.1 million (or111.4 million at the 1970
56. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1971 Supplement, Ghana, pages,
volume index from line 72a and price index from line 74a (1963 equals 100 for
both indexes), and Price Index converted to dollar terms, using IFS dollar export
unit values for period 1967 through 1969.148 Liberalization
exchange rate) greater than could be expected from past- relationships.57
With a windfall of such a magnitude the goods and services deficit of only
15 million during 1970 appears much less of a success. Put another way,
en
approximately 27 percent of the 1970 import bill was financed by the cocoa
windfall.
Moving into 1971, with an expected volume of sales approximately equal
to that of 1970, the predicted bean price based on the fit of equation (V.1)
above would be US $ 22.51 per hundred pounds. And as 1971 proceeded the
actual price received did fall towards that level. During the first quarter the
price averaged S 28.66, and in the second quarter, $ 24.41, continuing to fall
for the remainder of the year.58 On the basis of this information, a predic-
tion made towards the middle of 1971 would put estimated cocoa receipts nc
for the current year nearly $100 million less than during 1970. Yet with the
further liberalization of mid-1970, imports were continuing to grow at a
substantial rate: 20 percent greater in the first half of 1971 than in the at:
corresponding period of 1970. Itis within this context that the Finance to
Minister set about the task of drawing up the 1971 budget.
J.H. Mensah presented the second budget of the Progress Party govern.
ment to Parliament in late July 197 1 -Themajor feature was a drive toward
total liberalization of imports.59 At the same time it reflected the increasing-
ly complex nature of the policy mix adopted to deal with the growing bal-
ance-of-payments pressure while at the same time pursuing import liberaliza-
tion. The OGL list was extended further: over 76 percent of imports were
free of direct control.60 Surcharges were extended to specifically licenced ei
imports and, correcting a major anomaly, government imports (including pj
exempt public corporations) were now subject to import taxes.6Further, a
25 percent tax was levied on most non-commodity current payments, re-
ducing the discrimination in favor of invisibles over goods imports.62 Retreat-
57. If we were to take a shorter period, thus placing more weight on the later part in N
which Ghana was experiencing a reduced share of the world market, the price
response which would have been predicted to the increased volume of 1970 would
have been even greater than fitted relationship based on 1955 through 1969 data.
Such a measure would mean an even larger calculated windfall for 1970.
58. See IMF, International Financial Statistics, June 1972.
59. The details which follow are taken from the Budget Statement for 1971-72,. Accra,
27 July, 1971, unless otherwise indicated.
60. This figure is calculated by applying the new list to 1970 imports.
61. A Central Bureau of Statistics tabulation of government imports alone (excluding
exempt public entities) for 1970 indicates that government imports amounted to
8.5 percent of total imports.
62. Remittances of current profits which had previously queued were now guaranteed 6
but subject to a 25 percent tax. Transfers of foreign exchange for travel, payments 6
of commissions, interest and headquarters expenses were also subject to a 25 per-
cent tax. Airline and shipping remittances for other than merchandise imports,
remittances for insurance, and student remittances were subject to a 10 percent tax.The importLiberalization Experience, 196 7—1970 149
ingto a limited extent from liberalization, the restricted and banned lists
were expanded. And both to contain the surge of food imports as well as to
encourage local production, some food items —includingrice, sugar, and
a fresh or frozen fish which had been subject to low rates of duty and surcharge
--werewithdrawn from the OGL list.
In a move accompanying the budget, the export bonus (subsidy) for non-
) traditionalexports which had finally been enacted earlier in the year was
e increased from 10 percent on incremental values to 25 percent of the total
e value.63 The 25 percent bonus was also applied to tourist purchases of local
currency with convertible foreign exchange. In a related move, the procedures
for tax and duty drawbacks on exports had been simplified, making it feasible
now for exporters to take advantage of these provisions.64
The Finance Minister also took a major if incomplete step toward mone-
tary reform. Recognizing that the nominal interest rates were far too low to
attract a major volume of savings, he announced that commercial banks were
to increase their rates of interest on savings and time deposits from the
previous 43percent to a minimum of 4percent,and to pay interest at the
rate of 1percent on demand deposits. In addition, the bank rate was in-
creased frompercent to 8 percent. An accompanying set of instructions to
the commercial banks set the ceiling on loan rates at 11 percent, up from the
• previous 10 percent.65
The resumption of normal cocoa prices was also creating budgetary prob-
lems. The cocoa export tax, a progressive function of the local currency
export price, was yielding considerably less revenue than in the previous year.
Projected total revenues at existing tax rates indicated a decline in revenues
amounting to 121 million from the 1970—1971 revenues of490 mil-
lion. As a small partial remedy, an additional tax on income was introduced
• under the label: National Development Levy. Nevertheless, proposed internal
borrowing amounted to 129 million, in contrast with actual borrowing of
N4 49 million and 40 million in the two preceding fiscal years, plus a
25 million withdrawal from reserves.
En pushing forward with import liberalization, the government was con-
vinced that this would be the means whereby it could pull the economy out
of the doldrums. This opinion, however, was by no means unanimous in the
country or even within the government. Strong pressures for the abandon-
63. Legislative Instrument 700, 2 July, 1971, Gazette notification, 6 August, 1971.
64. Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, 25 June, 1971.
65. Bank of Ghana, Notice to Banks, No. 7 1/2. We understand that the Bank of Ghana
subsequently removed the ceiling on loan rates for all but loans to agriculture.150 Liberalization
ment of liberalization continued to be exerted.66 Time was running out if the
import liberalization was to be completed successfully.
Yet several problems remained. With cocoa export revenues declining to
more normal levels, and with the continued liberalization of imports, the
average level of import taxes would have to be substantially higher to hold
the de-licenced imports within reasonable bounds. However, the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate facing imports was only 4.5 percent greater in 1971
than in 1968, and even lower than in the second (post-devaluation) half of
1967. At the same time the domestic price level had continued to rise in the
period since 1968: the consumer price index for 1971 was 21.4 percent
greater than for 1968 and 31.2 percent above the 1967 average.67 In real
terms then, the effective exchange rate facing imports was declining at the
same time as a major liberalization of imports was proceeding. The entire
approach to liberalization had changed. Initially the liberalization had been c
an attempt to substitute an approximately equivalent price restriction for the
discarded quantitativerestrictions. Now however theliberalization had
become a switch from a closed to an open deficit financed by the cocoa
boom and aid donors.
For the industrial sector the haphazard protective structure that had been
further complicated by differentiated surcharges continued to reflect histori-
cal accidents rather than a carefully designed industrialization strategy. p
Non-cocoa exports remained in a state of relative neglect and at the same
time unnecessary regulation. Export promotional schemes had appeared and
disappeared with monotonous regularity. After two years of promises a a
scheme was now being implemented, but exporters could legitimately query,
would it last? Further, timber and most minor agricultural crops remained
under marketing boards of dubious promotional value.
The interest rate changes and related requirements dealing with govern- Pi
ment securities and expansion of credit, while laudable in intent, were not ci
well designed to achieve the thoroughgoing interest rate reform which would
be necessary to unify the segmented capital markets we described in Chapter M
IV. Further, the new regulations created a serious problem in squeezing the
commercialbanks' profitability by narrowing the gap between deposit and
loan rates. Instead of encouraging a competitive bidding for deposits and
active pursuit of non.prime borrowers, the regulations made it unprofitable
bd
66. In partial reply to his critics, J.H. Mensah concluded his budget speech with the e
Akan proverb, "When the gun is hot it is the stalwart who still carries it near his
bosom ."Budget Statement for 1971-72, Accra, July 1971.
67. Central Bureau of Statistics, Newsletter, 20 April, 1972. The national accounts data
do not at the time of writing extend beyond 1969, so that we are unable to
continue the GDP deflator series. 69r
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for banks to accept time and savings deposits, or to make risky loans with
high administrative costs.
Finally, the overall deficit budgeted for fiscal year 1971—1972 promised
to place continued upward pressure on domestic demand and prices, with the
consequent erosion in real effects of the higher nominal deposit interest rates,
export subsidies, and import taxes introduced in the same budget.
The evidence was rapidly accumulating. The open deficit without the
cocoa windfall could not be sustained. Strong medicine would be required to
keep imports under control and to save the liberalization. The trade account
surplus which Ghana had run since 1967 no longer existed. Yet it had been
used to cover the perennial services and transfers deficits as well as debt
service payments plus (in 1970 particularly) repurchase of substantial IMF
drawings that had been made in 1966 and 1967. During 1971 these payments
continued, along with the trade deficit, with the result that foreign-exchange
reserves were reaching a perilously low level: $40million at the end of the
third quarter in 1971, or less than half the trade deficit accumulated in the
first three quarters of 1971.
Discussions of solutions began within the government; later the IMF was
consulted about reopening the standby credit. The Fund apparently was very
discreet, not even suggesting that a devaluation would be a necessary com-
ponent of any package. The government, however, quickly focused on devalu-
ation as a simple single solution, not only to the balance-of-payments prob-
lem, but to a variety of other problems: the complex set of policies that had
accompanied introduction of liberalization could be abandoned while at the
same time saving the liberalization; and the large fiscal deficit could be ame-
liorated, easing the excessive aggregate demand pressure that was building up.
The solution adopted was devaluation. The decision rested largely with
Prime Minister Busia. In the preceding months he had taken increasingly more
control over economic decisions, and had become convinced that a devalua-
tion would provide a once-and-for-all solution. The Minister of Finance, J.H.
Mensah, was known to oppose devaluation as a "crude and blunt instru-
ment." However, he did not resign when the Prime Minister decided to de-
value.
The Prime Minister announced the devaluation in a broadcast to the nation
on December 27, 197168 The speech placed major emphasison the turmoil
in the world economy, and suggested that measures which had previously
been introduced, such as the surcharges, had been "to try to forestall the
economic problems that were moving in on us from overseas."69 The devalua-
68. The text of the Prime Minister's speech is reported in the Ghanaian Times, Tuesday,
December 28, 1971.
69. Ibid.152 Liberalization
tion announcement itself was buried in a list of specific measures being
taken "to simplify the increasingly complex structure that the individual
measures have tended to create."70
The size of the devaluation was almost incredible. The exchange rate
against the dollar was hiked from 1 .02 per dollar to1 .82 per dollar, a
rise of 78.2 percent. To this must be added the fact of the dollar devaluation ej
itself, announced a few days earlier, making the depreciation against other
currencies even greater. The weighted (by trade shares) average depreciation
against all currencies was reported as 92 percent.71
The net devaluation was somewhat, but not substantially, smaller on the
import side. Surcharges were abolished, lopping off approximately ten per- w
centage points of the gross devaluation. The taxes on other current payments, fr
which had been introduced in August of the same year. were also abolished. bi.
No data are yet available on the actual magnitude of collections, but if they
were fully enforced they would have amounted to no more than 20 percent U
on approximately one-fifth of total current account payments. Overall, the hi
net devaluation on the current payments side was about twelve percentage
points less than the gross.
On the earnings side, the 25 percent export and tourist bonuses were dl.
abolished. The affected items, however, accounted for less than 10 percent of
total current account receipts. More important was the decision for cocoa.
The producer price was increased by only 25 percent (from 8.00 to c
10.00 per headload) effective from the next mid-crop season.72 Similar price c
increases were promised to producers of other agricultural crops handled by t
the Cocoa Marketing Board. Other traditional exports, timber and minerals, fq
received the full benefit of the devaluation. The extent of the net devaluation
for current receipts thus varied considerably among cocoa, other traditional ai
exports, and nontraditional exports. Overall, however, because of the domi-
nance of cocoa, the net was significantly less than the gross.
A minor concession in the form of increased government wages was also ti
offered to partially offset the price increases arising from the devaluation. in
The increase ranged from percent for the lowest-paid to zero for those
earning over 1,000 per year.73
Following his outline of the devaluation package, the Prime Minister went
on to note that he hoped these measures "will enable the government to carry
70. Ibid.
71. Ghana Commercial Bank, Monthly Economic Bulletin. December 1971. 74
72. Most of the current crop had already been sold by the cocoa farmers.
73. This item was vaguely stated in the Prime Minister's speech, so that it could have
been taken, and was taken by many, to mean a 333 percent increase in the mini-
mum wage, although the actual meaning of the regulation was as stated above.r
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furtherthe policy of liberalization which it has pursued since coming into
office." He referred again to the "world-wide economic and financial tur-
moil," before concluding with a call for exporters "to show greater energy
and initiative," and an admonition that "for the rest of us, I know these
measures will make imported goods much dearer [but will] ...socreate more
employment for our own people and generally help our economy. This is the
best way of promoting self reliance."74
Considering the huge size of the devaluation, there was curiously little discus-
sion of it, or attempt to explain why so large a devaluation had been under-
taken. Apparently the Prime Minister believed that a massive devaluation
would solve the balance-of-payments problem for years to come, leaving him
free to concentrate on other issues. More than that, however, appears to have
been behind the decision on size. Clearly the first several percentage points
would be taken up in substituting devaluation for the surcharges and other
taxes and subsidies, so that to have any net impact the devaluation would
have to be larger than the existing effects of the recently introduced taxes
and subsidies. Beyond that, however, the devaluation was evidently being
used as a fiscal device. A major consideration in determining the size of the
devaluation was the revenue requirements of the government. With a large
government budgetary deficit looming, a substantial devaluation promised to
provide a major addition to government tax revenues, particularly via the
cocoa export tax. The cocoa export tax schedule is steeply progressive on the
cocoa price denominated irs local currency. Hence with the near doubling of
the local currency, unit-value cocoa exports would provide a substantial boost
for government revenue.75 A further consideration, but clearly not upper-
most in the minds of the inner decision-makers, may well have been that
aggregate expenditure in local-currency terms would also be dampened in a
manner similar to that of the 1967 devaluation. A devaluation about twice as
large as that of 1967 would have a substantial deflationary impact on domes-
tic expenditure. In addition to the effects arising from the initial excess of
imports over exports (see Chapter V, section 2b, above), one could in this
case expect a money demand effect: the public would reduce expenditure to
restore the real value of its money holdings.
Whatever the underlying reasons, the rate chosen meant a huge cut in real
income for the economy as a whole, with its immediate incidence on heavy
74. The Prime Minister's speech, op. cit.
75. At the same time, since government appropriations had already been fixed in terms
of cedis, the devaluation would not immediately increase government expenditures.
Heavily import-dependent Ministries, such as Defence, thus found the real value of
their appropriations slashed.154 Liberalization
net users of importables.76 The aggregate excess demand for real resources
that had been allowed to develop over the previous few years had been vented
this time on the import binge of 1970 and 1971. It could not now be
continued. This situation was in sharp contrast with the position of the
economy prior to the 1967 devaluation, where internal deflation and strict
limitation of imports had prevailed for the twelve months leading up to the
devaluation. Rather, it corresponded more closely to the situation of early
1966 when the contraction of available external resources had meant a sub-
stantial cut in real income, in that case via a tightening of import licencing.
The Prime Minister made no attempt in his speech to indicate the mag-
nitude of the cut in real income that would now be necessary, perhaps
recognizing the parallel between his situation and that of Nkrumah in January
1966. The import volume for 1972 would have to be reduced by at least
one-third of the 1971 volume, and perhaps more, if forthcoming obligations,
particularly the large debt-service payments, were to be met. Whatever the set
of policies adopted, that was the magnitude of the task, and that was the
magnitude of the shock to the economy.
The shock proved to be too much for major segments of the Ghanaian
society. Existing dissatisfaction with the Busia government was crystallized,
and on January 13, 1972, a previously little-known colonel of the army, 1K.
Acheampong, seized the opportunity to lead a successful military coup while
Prime Minister Busia was out of the country for medical treatment. High on
the list of justifications for the coup was "the inefficient management by that
[Busia] Regime of our economy.... It[the coup] was staged...to save the
country from total economic collapse." '1'
Thenew government quickly announced that it would reexamine both the
devaluation and Ghana's external debt problem. In the interim it introduced
an import-subsidy program on some essential consumer goods (milk, sugar,
baby food, sardines, machetes, bar soap, and cod fish), and ordered that these
commodities were to be sold at pre-devaluation prices.
Twenty-two days after the coup, Colonel Acheampong, Chairman of the
National Redemption Council, and Commissioner for Finance and for Eco-
nomic Affairs, announced a major new set of economic policies. The key-
76. It is important to recognize that the increased prices of importables arising from the
devaluation will normally affect both purchases and sales by the same proportion.
Hence the devaluation has a net taxing effect only on net purchasers of importables.
Net sellers of iniportables, such as domestic manufacturers of tradeables using im-
ported materials, will on the other hand be net gainers from the devaluation. The
view that a devaluation has a net taxing effect on them via increased costs of
importable inputs is thus purely myopic. 6
77. Colonel 1K. Acheampong, quoted in the Daily Graphic, Aecra, 18 January, 1972.
1,r
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stonewas a selective debt repudiation, accompanied by a revaluation of the
cedi to Ntt 1.28 per dollar, and a reimposition of strict import licencing.78
Even selective debt repudiation was something neither the National Libera-
tion Council government nor the Progress Party government of Prime Minister
Busia had been willing to do. Yet the total annual debt service burden was
amounting to some 20 percent of normal export earnings. Creditor govern-
ments guaranteeing suppliers' credit had indicated no willingness to extend
the repayments over a longer period without charging moratorium interest at
approximately 6 percent. In both of his budgets the previous Finance Minis-
ter, J.H. Mensah, had complained about the lack of sympathy on the part of
the creditor governments, and had staked out Ghana's position as requiring "a
long term settlement which allows the economy of Ghana to begin restoring
its basic strength before payments have to be resumed," and does not increase
the level of debt by means of moratorium interest.79
Colonel Acheampong now reiterated the Ghanaian position, "that our
foreign exchange resources simply could not at once sustain the debt service
obligations and meet our minimal development targets," and complained that
"the creditor countries...have proved singularly unsympathetic and unrespon-
sive to our well documented case."8° Short-term and long-term debts were
validated. However, he came down hard on suppliers'-credit debt. He: (a)
repudiated "all contracts which are vitiated by corruption, fraud and other
illegality," including those with a specific list of companies having an original
face value of $94.4million, while at the same time offering "to go to
arbitration in respect of all disputes arising from our action," with the IBRD's
International Centre for the Settlement of Domestic Disputes as arbiter;81
(b) refused to accept the rescheduling entered into by the two previous
governments, particularly the $72 million moratorium interest; (c) set out
conditions which suppliers'credits contracted before the overthrow of
Nkrumah must prove in order to establish the validity of their claims (valid
contracts not vitiated by fraud, corruption or other illegality, and only for
projects technically and economically viable and productive —theonus of
proof being on the creditor); and (d) unilaterally rescheduled the remaining
suppliers'-credit debts on terms similar to the IBRD's soft-loan window, the
International Development Association.
78. Vis-b-vis the original parity of 1.02 per dollar, this meant a 25 percent devalua-
tion against the dollar, and a depreciation (weighted by trade shares) of 36 percent
againat all currencies. In addition, Colonel Acheampong let stand several measures
which Busia had announced at the time of the December 1971 devaluation, including
the abolition of surcharges, taxes on invisibles, and the national development levy.
79. BudgetStatement for1971—1972, p. 21.
80. Ghanaian Times, 7 February, 1972.
81. Ibid.156 Liberalization
It was a dramatic and, many would argue, a long overdue move against this
all-too-common carpetbagger device of selling capital equipment. However,
this alone would not provide the magnitude of relief required for Ghana's
balance of payments. At best it postponed about 10 percent of Ghana's
foreign-exchange bill over the next few years.82 Far more severe cuts in
foreign-exchange use were required, and for this Colonel Acheampong chose
licencing, accompanied by a revaluation of the cedi.
The experiment with import liberalization was ended. The gains from
a
import liberalization did not appear sufficiently large to make the shock of
the massive December 1971 devaluation acceptable as a means of saving it.
Yet that devaluation had been assigned a task far greater than saving the
liberalization. Not only had it been used as a substitute for the complex set of
liberalization taxes and subsidies, but it had been used simultaneously in an
attempt to achieve two other objectives: an enormous cutback of imports,
and reduction in the accumulated excess demand for real resources. v
The most unpopular aspect was the reduction in real income it implied. c
Yet the liberalization and the devaluation bore the brunt of the criticism.
They were the scapegoat, while the true culprit —theprevious set of policies
which had been designed to obtain a higher level of consumption for Gha- It.
naians than the available resources would permit —escapeddetection. For the
new government the unpleasant task of facing up to the necessity of cutting
back the standard of living remained. It would now have to administer an
import program via licencing of approximately the same magnitude as had
been implicit in the original devaluation. Hence the immediate real income
difference between the two schemes was nil.83 Curiously, though, a given
volume of foreign-exchange use at a lower cedi price to the initial recipients
seemed preferable to the same volume at a higher cedi price.
How successful the new set of policies would prove to be remained uncer-
tam. One thing was certain: import liberalization was finished.
S
5. Import liberalization —atotal failure?
d
In the ultimate test —survival—theimport-liberalization experiment
failed. Yet such a test provides us with no clue as to the source of the failure.
82. The immediate net gain was also reduced by the response of those creditor nations
who were also aid donors, some of whom tended to reduce their long-term aid
commitments. iLl
83. While this is true for the very short run, the import program under licencing in the
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Wasimport liberalization inherently inappropriate in the Ghanaian context?
Or was it a suitable policy poorly implemented? Or were there mistakes
outside the realm of liberalization that brought about its failure?
A positive answer to each question could readily be constructed, depend-
ing largely on the breadth with which liberalization is defined and which
instruments of economic policy are taken as given. By selecting the appro-
priate set of assumptions, either explicitly or implicitly, about what is given
and what is not, it is possible to prove a great variety of conflicting proposi-
tions about the import liberalization. Such isthe nature of the political
debate that, ensues from the Ghanaian liberalization experience.
Our purpose here, is not to enter the political debate. Rather, the purpose
of this section is to elucidate the economic issues involved. In particular, it is
useful to know which elements of the experiment could be considered suc-
cessful, and which failures. And more importantly, our purpose is to draw
whatever lessons we can from the experience. We begin with a narrow frame
of reference in which we consider only the transfer of items from the Specific
Licence (SL) list to the Open General Licence (OGL) list.
We have seen how the absolute value of OGL imports grew over the period
1967 through 1970 (Table V-I 1). Hidden within this overall growth were the
initial reaction to placing an item on OGL and subsequent growth of items
remaining on OGL, mixed in different proportions each year. At the same
time itis important to note what was happening to imports that were still
under licence. To sort out the details we have separated the items placed on
OGL for a given year and traced the performance of those items only through
the year before they were placed on OGL, and through as many subsequent
years as possible. The results are contained in Table V.12.
Beginning with the items placed on OGL in 1967, we see that the value of
imports of those same items was slightly less during their first year on OGL
than during the previous year, while they had been under licence, and that
imports of those items did not grow substantially over the subsequent years.
Since the items involved were mostly food, pharmaceuticals, and spare parts,
it is not surprising to find that licences had previously been issued virtually on
demand.
The items placed on OGL for the first time for 1968 encompassed a
number of chemicals (including manufactured fertilizers), manufactures, and
machinery. During the first year on OGL, these items increased by 11 .2
percent over the previous (licence) year, which is high in terms of the histori-
cal growth of imports, but substantially lower than the 16.6 percent overall
increase in imports that year. They continued to grow during their second
and third years on OGL, but still at a slower rate than total imports.
Items added to OGL for 1969 began to include substantially more manu-
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wasa more substantial jump in imports of those items over the licenced value
of the previous year —anda further increase of about the same proportion in
the next year.
The final year for which we have the detailed trade data necessary to make
these calculations is 1970. The items added for 1970 were entirely food. (We
are excluding the items added in August 1970.) The result was a very substan-
tial surge of delicenced imports.
At the same time as newly delicenced imports were experiencing consider.
able growth (1969 and 1970), the volume of SL imports was not adjusted to
compensate for the switch of items to OGL. Thus in 1969 the licence budget
no longer had to provide for the Nd 24A million (1968 value) transferred to
OGL. Instead of delicencing by this amount, or otherwise making some allow-
ances for reasonable growth among the remaining items on SL, the total value
of licenced imports grew by 44 million. The growth of imports of the
items remaining under licence was thus 27.5 million, or a 12.7 percent
increase over those same items in 1968.
For 1970 the transfer of items to OGL and the change in SL imports is not
as clear because of .the addition to OGL of several items in August 1970.
Excluding those items added in August, the previous year's value of newly
delicenced imports amounted toNe 27.9 million, which is only slightly larger
than the decline in SL imports for all of 1970. However, this substantially
overstates the reduction of licencing in response to the transfer of items to
OGL because some portion, probably about one-half, of the value of items
transferred to OGL in August would already have been issued with licences,
and at the same time those added in August 1970 had been imported under
SL in 1969. Hence we again find a gap between the value of items transferred
to OGL and the expected reduction in SL imports.
A simple standard against which we may judge this growth of SL imports
is the cumulative value of delicenced imports, using the value of the year
prior to delicencing. This is a minimum value because it does not allow for
the growth which would have taken place in delicenced imports had they
remained under licencing. Items switched to OGL in 1969 and in 1970 had a
total value of52.0 million in the year prior to delicencing, yet over this
same period the value of SL imports fell by only23.3 million. In other
words, over one-half of the effect of transfer from SL to OGL was absorbed
by increased licences for those items which remained on the SL list.
What lessons can be drawn from this experience? Two major influences
were at work to increase the flow of imports: the release of pent-up demand
as items were transferred from SL to OGL, and overall aggregate demand
growth, which could now be vented on imports rather than domestic prices.
Potential restraining influences on OGL imports were surcharges plus aggre-
gate expenditure control —andon the remaining imports, licences. The evi-
dence strongly suggests that none of the restraining influences was adequate.160 Liberalization
The surges of OGL imports in 1969 and 1970 to satisfy the pent-up
demand indicate that surcharges were far from adequate to capture the pre-
vious quota premia and hence contain that demand. Further, the subsequent
high growth rates of OGL imports suggest that ageregate demand pressure
remained too strong to keep freed imports from growing too rapidly. This
placed a serious strain on the import liberalization. Such a strain by itself
would have been temporarily tolerated. However, at the same time as freed
imports were increasing substantially, the stringency of licencing was greatly
relaxed, allowing imports still under SL to take up much of the value of items
transferred to OGL. This Ghana could not afford simultaneously with the
chosen approach to OGL. In sum, the rapid growth of imports was due both
to an expanding OGL system with inadequate restraints in the form of sur-
charges and control over aggregate demand, and to a licencing system with
inadequate restriction of those items still within its purview.
Difficult and complex as was the basic task of freeing imports from li-
cencing, economic policy is made in a far broader framework. Numerous
objectives must be considered and numerous instruments employed. Liberal-
ization of imports cannot be treated in isolation from this broader framework
of government economic policy. Because liberalization was only one of sev-
eral objectives, and because of the limited number of effective instruments
available, it could therefore be argued that liberalization had to be corn-
promised in a less than optimal solution. Such an argument, however, ignores
an important trait of the broader framework of economic policy. All instru-
ments are now variable, and itis therefore potentially possible to assign
instruments to targets on the basis of the two important principles: (a) there
should be a number of effective instruments at least equal to the number of
desired independent targets; (b) instruments should be assigned to targets on a
the basis of their relative effectiveness in affecting the targets.84 Without
such an assignment of instruments to targets it becomes far more difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve the desired overall solution. While this is not the a.
place to launch an extended discussion of the theory and application of ti
general economic policy in Ghana, two major problems associated with the
import-liberalization experience suggest that the failure of liberalization was
inpart due to the broader failure of general economic policy in Ghana.
First, throughout both the period of restriction and the period of liberal-
ization there was a serious proliferation of policy instruments. By the late
1960's the accumulated assortment of instruments, acting in uncertain ways
84. These axe, of course, the well-known Tinbergen and Mundell points. For the former,
see J. Tinbergen, The Theory of Economic Policy, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1952, Chapter 5; and for the latter, R.A. Mundell, International Economics. Mac-
millan., New York, 1968, Chapter 14. 84Import LiberalizationA Total Failure? 161
ona variety of targets, made the effective formulation of economic policy an
incredibly difficult and complex task. The direction and magnitude of the
effects of the introduction of new policies and changes in old ones was
frequently uncertain, and occasionally perverse. The task of planning and
coping with such a complex and detailed system was far beyond what could
reasonably be expected from even the best possible cadre of economic plan-
ners. Caught up with the hopeless task of coping in the small, policy formula-
tion and implementation in the large was inevitably neglected. As a result, it
is relatively easy to look back, as we do now, to find serious errors in the
formulation and implementation of major policies. Two examples stand out:
the differentiated surcharges, and the size of the 1971 devaluation.
The primary objective of surcharges introduced in 1970 was to dampen
the pent-up demand for the newly freed imports, yet secondary objectives
which could have been achieved by use of other instruments also played a
role in the specification of the surcharge rates, with the consequence that the
surcharges accomplished neither the primary nor the secondary objectives. 85
To achieve the primary objective while minimizing the disturbance of other
policies, it would have been far more appropriate to employ uniform sur-
charges on freed items. A secondary objective, to discriminate between
luxury and other imports (which the differentiated quota premia reflected)
could have been achieved by the more appropriate instrument of indirect
taxes applied to both domestic and imported goods.
In a similar manner, the major objective of the 1971 devaluation was to
restore external balance while substituting devaluation for other equivalent
(and therefore not independent) instruments. But because the 1971 devalua-
tion was from an open deficit situation, it was also used in an attempt to
achieve a secondary objective, internal balance. To achieve both objectives
with the single instrument the devaluation had to be much larger than neces-
sary to achieve the primary objective alone, which ended in shocking the
economic and political system beyond acceptable limits. This contrasts with
the 1967 devaluation, which had been assigned a considerably more limited
task —restorationof external balance from a closed deficit position. And it
accomplished this task to the extent possible. It had not been used also to
achieve a massive cut in real income, for that had been done prior to the
devaluation and was thus not associated with devaluation per Se.
This leads us to the second important issue, the periodic jolts administered
to the economy since the beginning of the 1960's. As disequilibria built up,
typically little was effectively done to alleviate the situation until the last
possible moment. Then, because the massive size of the disequilibrium re-
85. See section 4 above.
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quired an equally massive adjustment, a drastic change had to be introduced.
Such fillips produced severe shocks to the Ghanaian economy and society at
large, so severe in fact that twice they were quickly followed by military
coups. It is worth emphasizing that the shock of readjustment was the prob-
lem, not devaluation, which was merely the instrument employed by Busia in
1971 to implement the readjustment. Licencing and austerity had been used
by Nkrumah in early 1966 to bring about readjustment following the import
binge Of 1965. Although the instruments were different, the shock to the
society and the consequences for the national leaders were the same.86
Regardless of the device employed to bring about adjustment, it is clear
that when adjustment became necessary large discrete changes were far less
acceptable than small continuous changes of the same total magnitude. Suc-
cessful formulation and implementation of economic policy requires more
than determining the correct instrument and the correct magnitude: it also
requires a careful attention to the time path of its incidence. Without such
attention, the shocks administered by the inevitable adjustments were unac-
ceptable.
The major lessons of the import-liberalization experience are clear. In the
face of rapidly growing aggregate demand financed by art unusual cocoa
windfall, and without adequate surcharges, by mid-1970 the liberalization
had been carried too far. In broader terms, liberalization did not succeed
because economic policy formulation and implementation failed. Bogged
down in the complexities of a detailed control system, the government corn-
mitted periodic policy blunders, placing the liberalization in jeopardy, unable
to withstand the inevitable shock of massive readjustment.
86. The source of financing for the disequilibrium does not appear to have had a
significant influence on the outcome. A careful examination of the balance-of-
payments accounts (Table A—3a) suggests that the rapid growth in the absolute size
of current account debits was financed differently in the Busia period than in the
Nkrumah period. En 1970 the increase in current account debits over 1969 was more
than financed by increased merchandise earnings, mostly due to the cocoa windfall.
En 1971, when merchandise earnings returned to their 1969 level, the current ac-
count debits remained at about their 1970 level without the available financing of
extra merchandise credits. Financing came largely from increased credits on the
monetary authorities' account (two-thirds) plus increased capital account credits
(one-third). Contrast this experience with the two cases of rapidly expanding cur-
rent account debits under Nkrumah. In both 1960—1961 and 1965 the increased
current account expenditures were financed only minimally by additional current
account earnings, and only about one-third by increased monetary account credits.
The major source for Nkrumah was increased capital account credits —i.e.,in-
creased external borrowing.
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